| Press
Release (report below) of
Intelligence Committee Senate Intelligence Committee Unveils Final Phase
II Reports on Prewar Iraq Intelligence ... -- Two Bipartisan
Reports Detail Administration Misstatements on Prewar Iraq Intelligence,
and Inappropriate Intelligence Activities by Pentagon Policy Office
-- Contact: Wendy Morigi (202) 224-6101 Thursday, June 5, 2008
Washington, DC -- The Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, John D. (Jay) Rockefeller IV, and a bipartisan majority of
the Committee (10-5), today unveiled the final two sections of its Phase
II report on prewar intelligence. The first report details Administration
prewar statements that, on numerous occasions, misrepresented the
intelligence and the threat from Iraq. The second report details
inappropriate, sensitive intelligence activities conducted by the DoD’s
Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, without the knowledge
of the Intelligence Community or the State Department.
“Before taking the country to war, this Administration owed it to the
American people to give them a 100 percent accurate picture of the threat
we faced. Unfortunately, our Committee has concluded that the
Administration made significant claims that were not supported by the
intelligence,” Rockefeller said. “In making the case for war, the
Administration repeatedly presented intelligence as fact when in reality
it was unsubstantiated, contradicted, or even non-existent. As a result,
the American people were led to believe that the threat from Iraq was much
greater than actually existed.”
“It is my belief that the Bush Administration was
fixated on Iraq, and used the 9/11 attacks by al Qa’ida as justification
for overthrowing Saddam Hussein. To accomplish this, top Administration
officials made repeated statements that falsely linked Iraq and al Qa’ida
as a single threat and insinuated that Iraq played a role in 9/11. Sadly,
the Bush Administration led the nation into war under false pretenses.
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to NFU page
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| Libby, fall guy MORE
He and Cheney outed Plame....see McClellan's book.
MORE |
Plame was outed because she was tracking Bush
neocons activities in WMD proliferation in Turkey and the Middle
East. MORE |
All related to (AIPAC) Rosen
Weissman espionage trial and the conviction of Larry Franklin. MORE |
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“There is no question we all relied on flawed intelligence. But,
there is a fundamental difference between relying on incorrect
intelligence and deliberately painting a picture to the American people
that you know is not fully accurate.
“These reports represent the final chapter in our oversight of prewar
intelligence. They complete the story of mistakes and failures – both by
the Intelligence Community and the Administration – in the lead up to
the war. Fundamentally, these reports are about transparency and holding
our government accountable, and making sure these mistakes never happen
again,” Rockefeller added.
The Committee’s report cites several conclusions in which the
Administration’s public statements were NOT supported by the
intelligence. They include:
Ø Statements and implications by the President and Secretary of State
suggesting that Iraq and al-Qa’ida had a partnership, or that Iraq had
provided al-Qa’ida with weapons training, were not substantiated by the
intelligence.
Ø Statements by the President and the Vice President indicating that
Saddam Hussein was prepared to give weapons of mass destruction to
terrorist groups for attacks against the United States were contradicted
by available intelligence information.
Ø Statements by President Bush and Vice President Cheney regarding the
postwar situation in Iraq, in terms of the political, security, and
economic, did not reflect the concerns and uncertainties expressed in the
intelligence products.
Ø Statements by the President and Vice President prior to the October
2002 National Intelligence Estimate regarding Iraq’s chemical weapons
production capability and activities did not reflect the intelligence
community’s uncertainties as to whether such production was ongoing.
Ø The Secretary of Defense’s statement that the Iraqi government
operated underground WMD facilities that were not vulnerable to
conventional airstrikes because they were underground and deeply buried
was not substantiated by available intelligence information.
Ø The Intelligence Community did not confirm that Muhammad Atta met an
Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague in 2001 as the Vice President
repeatedly claimed.
Additionally, the Committee issued a report on the Intelligence
Activities Relating to Iraq conducted by the Policy Counterterrorism
Evaluation Group and the Office of Special Plans within the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. The report found that the
clandestine meetings between Pentagon officials and Iranians in Rome and
Paris were inappropriate and mishandled from beginning to end. Deputy
National Security Advisor Steve Hadley and Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz
failed to keep the Intelligence Community and the State Department
appropriately informed about the meetings. The involvement of Manucher
Ghobanifer and Michael Ledeen in the meetings was inappropriate.
Potentially important information collected during the meetings was
withheld from intelligence agencies by Pentagon officials. Finally, senior
Defense Department officials cut short internal investigations of the
meetings and failed to implement the recommendations of their own
counterintelligence experts.
Today’s reports are the culmination of efforts that began in March
2003, when, as Vice Chairman, Senator Rockefeller initially requested an
investigation into the origin of the fraudulent Niger documents. In June
2003, he was joined by all Democrats on the Committee in pushing for a
full investigation into prewar intelligence, which was eventually expanded
by the Committee in February 2004 to include the five phase II tasks.
The Committee released its first report on July 9, 2004, which focused
primarily on the Intelligence Community’s prewar assessments of Iraq’s
weapons of mass destruction programs and links to terrorism. Those
findings helped lay the foundation for some of the intelligence reforms
enacted into law in late 2004.
In September 2006, the Committee completed and publicly released two
sections of Phase II: The Use by the Intelligence Community of Information
Provided by the Iraqi National Congress; and Postwar Findings About Iraq’s
WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare with Prewar
Assessments.
In May 2007, the Committee released the third section of Phase II:
Prewar Intelligence Assessments About Postwar Iraq.
Separately, in early 2007, the Pentagon Inspector General released its
own report on the intelligence activities conducted by the Office of the
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and also concluded that those
activities were inappropriate
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| report:
Filed, under authority of the order of the Senate of June __, 2008
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, United States Senate 110TH
Congress
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, WEST VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN; CHRISTOPHER S. BOND,
MISSOURI, VICE CHAIRMAN; DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CALIFORNIA; JOHN
WARNER, VIRGINIA RON WYDEN, OREGON CHUCK HAGEL, NEBRASKA; EVAN BAYH,
INDIANA; SAXBY CHAMBLISS, GEORGIA BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, MARYLAND;
ORRIN HATCH, UTAH; RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, WISCONSIN; OLYMPIA SNOWE, MAINE;
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, RHODE ISLAND; RICHARD BURR, NORTH CAROLINA; HARRY
REID, NEVADA;
EX OFFICIO MITCH MCCONNELL, KENTUCKY; EX OFFICIO CARL LEVIN, MICHIGAN;
EX OFFICIO JOHN MCCAIN, ARIZONA, EX OFFICIO
Whether Public Statements Regarding Iraq by U.S. Government Officials
Were Substantiated by Intelligence Information
I. Scope and Methodology
(U) This report’s scope, as agreed to unanimously by the Committee on
February 12, 2004, is to assess "whether public statements and
reports and testimony regarding Iraq by U.S. Government officials made
between the Gulf War period and the commencement of Operation Iraqi
Freedom were substantiated by intelligence information.
(U) In order to complete this task, the Committee decided to
concentrate its analysis on the statements that were central to the nation’s
decision to go to war. Specifically, the Committee chose to review five
major policy speeches by key Administration officials regarding the
threats posed by Iraq, Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs, Iraqi
ties to terrorist groups, and possible consequences of a US invasion of
Iraq. These include:
- Vice President Richard Cheney, Speech in Tennessee to the Veterans
of Foreign Wars National Convention, August 26, 2002
- President George W. Bush, Statement before the United Nations
General Assembly, September 12, 2002.3
- President George W. Bush, Speech in Cincinnati, October 7,
2002.4 •
- President George W. Bush, State of the Union address, January 28,
2003.5 •
- Secretary of State Colin Powell, Speech to the United Nations
Security Council, February 5, 2003.
(U) These speeches are the best representations of how the Bush
Administration communicated intelligence analysis to the Congress, the
American people, and the international community. They are also fairly
comprehensive in scope, so evaluations about whether a particular
statement in a speech was substantiated can be extrapolated to cover
similar statements made at similar times. The Committee believes that
these speeches would have been subject to careful review inside the White
House and most were also reviewed by the intelligence community. (The
drafting processes for the Secretary of State’s speech to the Security
Council, and portions of the 1 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Press Release, "Chairman Roberts and Vice Chairman Rockefeller Issue
Statement on Intelligence Committee’s Review of Pre-War Intelligence in
Iraq," February 12, 2004.
- Transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov.news/releases/2002/08/20020826.html,
link
last visited March 21, 2008. 3
- Transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov.news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html,
link
last visited March 21, 2008.
- Transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov.news/releases/2002/10/20021007-8.html,
link
last visited March 21, 2008.
- Transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html,
link
last visited March 2 1 , 2008.
- Transcript available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2003/17300.html,
link
last visited March 21, 2008.
continued below
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| IIa
110th Congress S. Report 2nd Session SENATE 110- REPORT ON WHETHER
PUBLIC STATEMENTS REGARDING IRAQ BY U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WERE
SUBSTANTIATED BY INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION together with ADDITIONAL
AND MINORITY VIEWS June _2008. - Ordered to be
printed |
- Vulture
Capitalist, ...beware... lhe supports
limited hangout news sites like Media Matters, MoveOn.org, Huffington
Post. They don't report on reopening 911 investigation, CIA
Carnaby murder by Houston police, Israel. Russian Israeli Mob.
- Go to Iran weapons to Bosnia / Afghanistan
Muslim extremists... Clinton impeachment a smoke screen to hide this..
1998, What did Hillary know?
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| go to:news,
CIA Houston station chief gunned down by HPD.... connected to Port of
Houston security, Israel, Russia mob
|
Link Deborah Jeane
Palfrey CIA, Foggo, Wilkes, Hookergate and Gov, Bob Ehrlich ... and
Cheney,
911, Iran Attack?
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Mukasey, Schumer, Feinstein, Conflict
of Interest
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2003 State of the Union and the President’s speech in Cincinnati, are
all discussed in the Committee’s first report on pre-war Iraq
intelligence, Senate Report 108-301. The Vice President’s August 2002
speech was not reviewed by the intelligence community. Intelligence
officials have told the Committee that they could not find any evidence
that the President’s September 2002 address to the UN General Assembly
was reviewed by the intelligence community.
- (U) The Committee selected particular statements from these speeches
that pertained to eight categories: nuclear weapons, biological
weapons, chemical weapons, weapons of mass destruction (generally),
methods of delivery, links to terrorism, regime intent, and
assessments about the post-war situation in Iraq. The report is
organized along these eight categories, with each section listing the
relevant statements from the speeches.
- (U) This report does not include statements made prior to summer
2002 or statements made by officials of the United States Government
beyond the top levels of the Executive Branch. At the end of each
section, following analysis of the five speeches, the Committee has
listed additional statements by senior officials from the same time
period. Those statements that contain assertions not included in the
five major policy speeches have been examined further, to determine
whether they were substantiated by available intelligence.
- (U) To conduct this review, the Committee assembled hundreds of
intelligence reports produced prior to March 19, 2003 in an effort to
understand the state of intelligence analysis at the time of various
speeches and statements. The Committee is fully aware that officials
may have had multiple credible sources of information upon which to
base statements, but has not attempted to document or analyze source
materials other than the intelligence, since that is beyond the scope
of this report. (U) Furthermore, the Committee reviewed only finished
analytic intelligence documents, with few exceptions. This did not
include intelligence reports "from the field" or less formal
communications between intelligence agencies and other parts of the
Executive Branch.
- (U) The Committee has attempted to note where disagreements existed
within the Intelligence Community and where different reporting could
substantiate different interpretations. In order to complete this
task, however, this report focuses first on major coordinated
inter-agency intelligence reports such as National Intelligence
Estimates, Intelligence Community Assessments and Briefs, and other
consensus products. These products are not only the most
authoritative, representing the full Intelligence Community position
on the issues they cover, but also tend to be widely circulated within
the government. The Committee also examined assessments, reports and
statements to Congress from individual intelligence agencies to
address those issues for which coordinated reports were not available
or where there was disagreement among agencies.
- (U) In addition to examining the question of whether public
statements were substantiated by the underlying intelligence, the
Committee’s review also addressed the extent to which statements
were incomplete and where relevant Intelligence Community assessments
were not made part of the public discourse. A public statement that
selectively uses only that intelligence that supports a particular
policy position while ignoring or disregarding intelligence that
either weakens or contradicts the position may be accurate on its face
but present a slanted picture nonetheless.
- (U) Overlaying this issue of the selective use of intelligence is
the more fundamental issue of the selective declassification of
intelligence. Intelligence information contained in many of the
speeches analyzed in this report had to be declassified before being
released publicly. The Executive Branch has the prerogative to
classify information to protect national security, and unlike Congress
the Executive Branch can declassify information relatively easily.
Until the Congress sought and obtained the release of an unclassified
version of the key judgments of the October 2002 National Intelligence
Estimate on Iraq’s presumed weapons of mass destruction programs,
the analytical judgments of the Intelligence Community on these
matters were classified. The collected intelligence underlying these
judgments remained classified until after the invasion of Iraq. Few,
if any, of the Intelligence Community’s assessments on Iraq’s
links to terrorism, the intent of the Iraqi regime, projected post-war
conditions, or other relevant matters contained in the statements of
senior officials were publicly released before the war. This ability
of the Executive Branch to unilaterally declassify and divulge
intelligence information at a time, place, and in a manner of its
choosing must also be taken into account when evaluating policymakers’
use of intelligence information. _ 3
II. Nuclear Weapons • "The Iraqi regime has in fact been very
busy enhancing its capabilities in the field of chemical and biological
agents. And they continue to pursue the nuclear program they began so many
years ago." - Vice President Richard Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee,
August 26, 2002 •
- "But we now know that Saddam has resumed his efforts to acquire
nuclear weapons." - Vice President Richard Cheney, Nashville,
Tennessee, August 26, 2002 • "Many of us are convinced that
Saddam will acquire nuclear weapons fairly soon." - Vice
President Richard Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee, August 26, 2002 •
- "What he wants is time and more time to husband his resources,
to invest in his ongoing chemical and biological weapons programs, and
to gain possession of nuclear arms.” - Vice President Richard
Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee, August 26, 2002
- "Today, Iraq continues to withhold important information about
its nuclear program — weapons design, procurement logs, experiment
data, an accounting of nuclear materials and documentation of foreign
assistance. Iraq employs capable nuclear scientists and technicians.
It retains physical infrastructure needed to build a nuclear weapon.
Iraq has made several attempts to buy high-strength aluminum tubes
used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon. Should Iraq acquire
fissile material, it would be able to build a nuclear weapon within a
year. And Iraq’s state-controlled media has reported numerous
meetings between Saddam Hussein and his nuclear scientists, leaving
little doubt about his continued appetite for these weapons." -
President George W Bush, Address to the United Nations General
Assembly, September 12, 2002 •
- "But Saddam Hussein has defied all these efforts and continues
to develop weapons of mass destruction. The first time we may be
completely certain he has a — nuclear weapons is when, God forbids,
he uses one." - President George W Bush, Address to the United
Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002 •
- "The Iraqi regime has violated all of these obligations. It
possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons. It is seeking
nuclear weapons." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio,
October 7, 2002 •
- "The evidence indicates that Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear
weapons program. Saddam Hussein has held numerous meetings with Iraqi
nuclear scientists. . .Satellite photographs reveal that Iraq is
rebuilding facilities at sites that have been part of its nuclear
program in the past. Iraq has attempted to purchase high-strength
aluminum tubes and other equipment needed for gas centrifuges, which
are used to enrich uranium for nuclear weap0ns." - President
George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002
- "If the Iraqi regime is able to produce, buy or steal an amount
of highly enriched uranium a little larger than a single softball, it
could have a nuclear weapon in less than a year." - President
George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "Facing
clear evidence of peril we cannot wait for the final proof- the
smoking gun - that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud." -
President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 •
- "After eleven years during which we have tried containment,
sanctions, inspection, even selected military action, the end result
is that Saddam Hussein still has chemical and biological weapons and
is increasing his capabilities to make more. And he is moving ever
closer to developing a nuclear weapon." - President George W
Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 •
- "We could wait and hope that Saddam does not give weapons to
terrorists, or develop a nuclear weapon to blackmail the world. But I’m
convinced that is a hope against all evidence." - President
George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002
- "To spare himself, he agreed to systematically disarm of all
weapons of mass destruction. For the next twelve years, he
systematically violated that agreement. He pursued chemical,
biological and nuclear weapons, even while inspectors were in his
country. Nothing to date has restrained him from his pursuit of these
weapons — not economic sanctions, not isolation from the civilized
world, not even cruise missile strikes on his military
facilities." - President George W Bush, State of the Union
Address, January 29, 2003 •
- "The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein
recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa. Our
intelligence sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high—strength
aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production." ·
President George W Bush, State of the Union Address, January 29, 2003
•
- "We have no indication that Saddam Hussein has ever abandoned
his nuclear weapons program. On the contrary, we have more than a
decade of proof that he remains determined to acquire nuclear
weapons." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the
United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 •
- "Saddam Hussein is determined to get his hands on a nuclear
bomb. He is so determined that he has made repeated covert attempts to
acquire high-specification aluminum tubes from eleven different
countries, even after inspections resumed." - Secretary of State
Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February
5, 2003 •
- "By now, just about everyone has heard of these tubes and we
all know that there are differences of opinion. There is controversy
about what these tubes are for. Most U.S. experts think they are
intended to serve as rotors in centrifuges used to enrich uranium.
Other experts, and the Iraqis themselves, argue that they are really
to produce the rocket bodies for a conventional weapon, a multiple
rocket launcher." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to
the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 •
- "Intercepted communications from mid-2000 through last summer
showed that Iraq front companies sought to buy machines that can be
used to balance gas centrifuge rotors. One of these companies also had
been involved in a failed effort in 2001 to smuggle aluminum tubes
into Iraq." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the
United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 •
- "We also have intelligence from multiple sources that Iraq is
attempting to acquire magnets and high—speed balancing machines.
Both items can be used in a gas centrifuge program to enrich
uranium." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the
United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003
- (U) In major policy speeches the President, the Vice President and
the Secretary of State indicated that the Iraqi government had an
active nuclear weapons program. The President and the Secretary of
State both indicated that this nuclear weapons program had continued
even while international weapons inspectors were in Iraq. Vice
President’s Speech in Tennessee (August 26, 2002)
- (U) In the Vice President’s August 2002 speech on Iraq, he stated
that the Iraqi regime had resumed pursuit of a nuclear weapons
development program, and said "many of us are convinced that
Saddam Hussein will acquire nuclear weapons fairly soon". He also
said that "Saddam has resumed his efforts to acquire nuclear
weapons", and that the Iraqi regime "continue[s] to pursue
the nuclear program they began so many years ago."7
- (U) In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the intelligence community
produced a number of coordinated assessments regarding possible Iraqi
nuclear programs. These assessments consistently concluded that the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations
Special Commission (UNSCOM) had destroyed or neutralized Iraq’s
pre-Gulf War nuclear infrastructure, and that Iraq did not appear to
have reconstituted its nuclear weapons pro gram.8
- (U) These assessments were also consistent in assessing that Iraq
had maintained some of the intellectual capital and physical
infrastructure necessary for a nuclear weapons program, and that Iraq
continued to procure "dual-use" technologies, with both
nuclear and non-nuclear potential 7 White House Transcript, Vice
President Speaks at VFW 103'd National Convention, August 26, 2002. 8
Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee Report, Reconstitution of
Iraq ’s Nuclear Weapons Program: An Update, October 1997; National
Intelligence Council Memorandum., Current WMD Capabilities, October
1998; Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee Report,
Reconstitution of Iraq ’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Post Desert Fox,
June 1999; Intelligence Community Assessment, Iraq.· Steadily
Pursuing WMD Capabilities, December 2000; and National Intelligence
Estimate, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile
Threat Through 2015, December 2001. (These reports are summarized in
Report on the US. Intelligence Community ’s Prewar Intelligence
Assessments on Iraq, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate
Report 108-301, July 9, 2004). They agreed that if Iraq decided to
restart a nuclear weapons program, with proper foreign assistance it
could produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon within five
to seven years, and that if Iraq in some way acquired adequate fissile
material from a foreign source, it could produce a nuclear weapon
within one year. The December 2001 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)
on foreign missile developments also noted that "Recent Iraqi
procurements. . .suggest possible preparation for a renewed uranium
enrichment program,” a slight shift in the intelligence community’s
judgments, but still consistent with the judgment that Iraq did not
appear to have reconstituted its nuclear weapons program.9
- (U) The intelligence community’s collective judgment that Iraq did
not appear to have reconstituted its nuclear weapons program did not
change until the publication of the October 2002 NIE on Iraqi WMD
programs, which was the next NIE to address the topic. However, some
individual agencies shifted their perspectives before this point. In
April 2001, the CIA noted that Iraq’s attempts to purchase
high-strength aluminum tubes and other dual-use equipment suggested
that a reconstitution effort might be underway. This judgment was
included in several other CIA assessments. 10 In August 2002 the CIA
published a paper on Iraqi WMD capabilities (Iraq: Expanding WMD
Capabilities Pose Growing Threat), which concluded that these
procurement activities indicated that the Iraqi government had
restarted its nuclear weapons program. ll
- (U) The Defense Intelligence Agency produced several similar
assessments in 2002, noting in a May 2002 report that "Although
there is no firm evidence of a current nuclear weapon design effort,
we judge that continued procurement of dual-use nuclear-related items,
key personnel assigned to nuclear weapon-capable sites, construction
at nuclear facilities, and Saddam’s interactions with the Iraqi
Atomic Energy Commission all indicate that Saddam has not abandoned
the nuclear weapon pro gram."l2
- (U) The Department of Energy (DOE) disagreed with the CIA’s
conclusions regarding the aluminum tubes, and assessed that it was
more likely that the tubes were intended for a different use, such as
a conventional rocket program.13 Based on other evidence, including
Saddam’s
- 9 rm. l° Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Iraq -
Purchases Could Revive Nuclear Program (SC_No: PASS SEIB 01- 083CHX),
April 10, 2001; CIA, Iraq: New Effort to Get Centrifuge Tubes, July
2001; Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Iraq: Nuclear-Related
Procurement Efforts, October 18, 2001; Senior Executive Intelligence
Brief Iraq: Seeking to Rebuild Enrichment Capability, November 2001;
CIA, Iraq: Centrifuge-based Uranium Enrichment Program Before and
After Gulf War, November 2001; CIA Senior Executive Memorandum,
December 15, 2001; CIA, Iraq: Status of the Nuclear Program, January
11, 2002; CIA, Iraq: Status of Baghdad ’s Uranium Enrichment
Program, March 2002. UCLA, Iraq: Expanding WMD Capabilities Pose
Growing Threat, August 2002. 12 DIA EH, Baghdad apparentlv has
increased its activity at former and suspect nuclear sites, January
15, 2002; DIA Defense Intelligence Assessment, Iraq 's Weapons of Mass
Destruction and Theater Ballistic Missile Programs: Post-9-1 1
September, January 2002; DIA Information Paper, Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, April 15, 2002; DIA Information Paper, Comparison of
NBC and missiles programs in Iraq, Iran and Syria, September 10, 2002;
DIA, Iraq — Key WIMD Facilities An Operational Support Study,
September 2002; DIA, Iraq: Nuclear Program Handbook (DI-1610-81-01),
Defense Intelligence Assessment, May 2002; DIA, Iraq’s Reemerging
Nuclear Weapon Program, September 2002. B Department of Energy Daily
Intelligence Highlight, Iraq: High Strength Aluminum Tube Procurement,
April 11, 2001; Department of Energy Technical Intelligence Note, Iraq’s
Gas Centrifuge Program: Is Reconstitution Underway?, August 17, 2001.
. _ 7
meetings with Iraqi nuclear scientists, and possible attempts to
procure uranium from Niger, the DOE assessed in July 2002 that Saddam
Hussein might be attempting to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program, but
suggested that the evidence was not conclusive.14
- (U) The Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research
(State/INR) disagreed with the CIA that Iraq had restarted a nuclear
weapons program, and concurred with the DOE that the aluminum tubes
were probably intended for other purposes. This view was included in
congressional testimony in September 2002, but State/INR did not
publish any reports on the aluminum tubes outside of the State
Department until after publication of the October 2002 NIE.15 _
Several of these intelligence agencies also made reference to
assessments by the National Ground Intelligence Center (N GIC)
regarding the aluminum tubes. Testimony by the Director of Central
Intelligence to Congress stated that NGIC judged that "Iraq’s
dimensional requirements for the tubes are far stricter than necessary
for rocket casings." A later memo from State/INR said that
"the IAEA and - pertinent nuclear—technical experts have
concluded independently that the aluminum tubes are not intended for
Iraq’ s nuclear program and are consistent with rocket casings. .
.DOE and DoD’s National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) concur on
this assessment, though NGIC does not share most of the other DOE
views on tactical rockets."l6
- (U) According to a DIA report, the intelligence community continued
to assess that it would take five to seven years from the commencement
of a revived nuclear program for the Iraqi government to indigenously
produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon. This same report
repeated the assessment that a nuclear weapon could be constructed
much faster if adequate fissile material was acquired from a foreign
source, though an earlier CIA assessment noted that "we have not
detected a dedicated Iraqi effort to obtain fissile material
abroad."17 President’s Speech to the UN General Assembly
(September 12, 2002)
- (U) In the President’s address to the United Nations General
Assembly, he stated that Iraq continued to develop weapons of mass
destruction, and indicated that Iraq had an ongoing nuclear weapons
program. Specifically, he referred to Iraqi efforts to purchase
aluminum tubes, Iraqi efforts to conceal information about its
pre-Gulf War nuclear program, and meetings between Saddam Hussein and
Iraqi nuclear scientists. He noted that Iraq possessed some of the
intellectual capital and physical infrastructure that would be
necessary for a nuclear weapons program, and said that if Iraq could
"acquire iissile material, it would be able to build a nuclear
weapon within a year."18 (U) As noted above, the intelligence
community had assessed for years that while Iraq’s nuclear
infrastructure had been destroyed or neutralized by the IAEA and the
UN, Iraq still possessed some of the physical infrastructure and
scientific personnel that would be necessary for reconstituting a
nuclear weapons program. Though the intelligence community as a whole
had not yet concluded that a nuclear weapons program was underway,
some (though not all) intelligence agencies believed that Iraq’s
attempts to acquire high-strength aluminum tubes, along with
supporting evidence such as Saddam’s meetings with Iraqi nuclear
science personnel, indicated that the nuclear program was in fact
being reconstituted
- M Department of Energy Daily Intelligence Highlight,
Nuclear Reconstitution Ejforts Underway?, July 22, 2002. 15 Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence transcript of Hearing on Iraq,
September 17, 2002; Report on the US. Intelligence Community ’s
Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, Senate Report 108-301, July 9, 2004. 16 Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence transcript of Hearing on Iraq, September 17,
2002; State/INR Memorandum, Iraq: Quest for Aluminum Tubes, October 9,
2002. 17 CIA, Senior Executive Memorandum, December 15, 2001; DIA,
Iraq.· Nuclear Program Handbook (DI-1610-81- 01), Defense
Intelligence Assessment, May 2002 (citing the views of the
intelligence community). _ 8
- . (U) Intelligence community analysts generally believed that the
Iraqi govemment’s failure to provide certain evidence and documents
regarding its pre-1991 nuclear program indicated that the Iraqi governmentwas
attempting to conceal this information. However, this conclusion was
not cited by the intelligence community as compelling evidence for a
reconstituted, post-Gulf War nuclear weapons program.19
- (U) Numerous intelligence assessments made reference to open source
information showing that Saddam met with personnel from the Iraqi
Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC).2°
- (U) At the time of the President’s address to the General
Assembly, the intelligence community had not changed its judgment that
it would take Iraq at least several years to produce enough fissile
material for a nuclear weapon (‘five to seven years’ was the
commonly cited timeframe, though a September 2002 DIA report judged
that it could be done in four)2l, and that Iraq could build a nuclear
weapon within one year if it in some way acquired an adequate amount
of iissile material from a foreign source. President’s Speech in
Cincinnati (October 7, 2002)
- (U) In the President’s speech on Iraq in Cincinnati, he stated
that the Iraqi regime was "seeking nuclear weapons", and
that Saddam Hussein was "moving ever closer to developing a
nuclear weapon". He reiterated earlier statements about Saddam
holding "numerous meetings with Iraqi nuclear scientists”, and
attempting to "purchase high-strength aluminum tubes and other
equipment needed for gas centrifuges”. He also said that Iraq was
"rebui1ding facilities at sites that have been part of its
nuclear program in the 2past", and that "the evidence
indicates that Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons pro gram."2
18 White House Transcript, President’s Remarks at the United Nations
General Assembly, September 12, 2002. 19 CIA, Iraq: Continuing To
Stonewall IAEA, July 10, 1998; DIA, Iraq: Nuclear Program Handbook
(DI-1610-81- 01), Defense Intelligence Assessment, May 2002; and CIA,
Iraq: Status of the Nuclear Program, January 11, 2002. 20 DOE, Iraq:
Nuclear Reconstitution Efforts Underway? , July 22, 2002; CIA, Iraq:
Questions on Nuclear Timeline, September 11, 2002; Report on the US.
Intelligence Community 's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq,
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Report 108-301, July
9, 2004. 21 DIA, Iraq — Key WMD Facilities An Operational Support
Study, September 2002. 22 White House Transcript, President Bush
Outlines Iraqi Threat, October 7, 2002. _ 9 .... this file originally
created by NewsFollowUp.com Steve Francis on June 7, 2008.
- (U) The President also repeated his statement that if the Iraqi
regime came to possess highly emiched uranium, "it could have a
nuclear weapon in less than a year." Additionally, he suggested
that there was clear evidence that Iraq was developing a nuclear
weapon, declaring that "facing clear evidence of peril we cannot
wait for the final proof- the smoking grm — that could come in the
form of a mushroom cloud." He concluded that "we could wait
and hope that Saddam does not give weapons to terrorists, or develop a
nuclear weapon to blackmail the world. But I’m convinced that is a
hope against all evidence."23
- (U) In the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on
Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, the intelligence community
expressed the majority view (with all agencies except State/INR
concurring) that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.
This conclusion was based on three primary bodies of evidence: Iraqi
procurement attempts (primarily of aluminum tubes, but also including
other dual-use technologies, such as magnets, high-speed balancing
machines, and machine tools), apparent regime efforts to reestablish
Iraq’s cadre of weapons personnel, and apparent activity at several
suspected nuclear weapons sites.24
- (U) State/INR dissented from the majority view, and stated in the
NIE that the available evidence did "not add up to a compelling
case for reconstitution" of an Iraqi nuclear weapons program. The
DOE dissented from the majority view that the high-strength aluminum
tubes were intended for use in a nuclear program, but concurred with
the majority judgment that reconstitution was underway.25
- (U) In addition to discussing Iraqi attempts to procure aluminum
tubes and other dual-use technologies, the NIE described meetings
between Saddam Hussein and IAEC personnel. The NIE, like several
earlier DIA reports, also discussed construction at facilities that
might have nuclear applications Construction at sites known to have
been part of Iraq’s pre-Gulf War nuclear weapons program was
mentioned in earlier assessments (though not specifically in the NIE).26
- (U) State/IN`R’s altemative views, which were incorporated in the
NIE, said that State/ INR accepted "the view of technical experts
at the Department of Energy" who concluded that the aluminum
tubes were "poorly suited" for a nuclear weapons program.
The altemative views also cast doubt on the judgment that other
dual-use procurement efforts were related to a nuclear program, and
went on to say that "the informat
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