| report:
Filed, under authority of the order of the Senate of June __, 2008
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, United States Senate 110TH
Congress
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, WEST VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN; CHRISTOPHER S. BOND,
MISSOURI, VICE CHAIRMAN; DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CALIFORNIA; JOHN
WARNER, VIRGINIA RON WYDEN, OREGON CHUCK HAGEL, NEBRASKA; EVAN BAYH,
INDIANA; SAXBY CHAMBLISS, GEORGIA BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, MARYLAND;
ORRIN HATCH, UTAH; RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, WISCONSIN; OLYMPIA SNOWE, MAINE;
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, RHODE ISLAND; RICHARD BURR, NORTH CAROLINA; HARRY
REID, NEVADA;
EX OFFICIO MITCH MCCONNELL, KENTUCKY; EX OFFICIO CARL LEVIN, MICHIGAN;
EX OFFICIO JOHN MCCAIN, ARIZONA, EX OFFICIO
Whether Public Statements Regarding Iraq by U.S. Government Officials
Were Substantiated by Intelligence Information
I. Scope and Methodology
(U) This report’s scope, as agreed to unanimously by the Committee on
February 12, 2004, is to assess "whether public statements and
reports and testimony regarding Iraq by U.S. Government officials made
between the Gulf War period and the commencement of Operation Iraqi
Freedom were substantiated by intelligence information.
(U) In order to complete this task, the Committee decided to
concentrate its analysis on the statements that were central to the nation’s
decision to go to war. Specifically, the Committee chose to review five
major policy speeches by key Administration officials regarding the
threats posed by Iraq, Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs, Iraqi
ties to terrorist groups, and possible consequences of a US invasion of
Iraq. These include:
- Vice President Richard Cheney, Speech in Tennessee to the Veterans
of Foreign Wars National Convention, August 26, 2002
- President George W. Bush, Statement before the United Nations
General Assembly, September 12, 2002.3
- President George W. Bush, Speech in Cincinnati, October 7,
2002.4 •
- President George W. Bush, State of the Union address, January 28,
2003.5 •
- Secretary of State Colin Powell, Speech to the United Nations
Security Council, February 5, 2003.
(U) These speeches are the best representations of how the Bush
Administration communicated intelligence analysis to the Congress, the
American people, and the international community. They are also fairly
comprehensive in scope, so evaluations about whether a particular
statement in a speech was substantiated can be extrapolated to cover
similar statements made at similar times. The Committee believes that
these speeches would have been subject to careful review inside the White
House and most were also reviewed by the intelligence community. (The
drafting processes for the Secretary of State’s speech to the Security
Council, and portions of the 1 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Press Release, "Chairman Roberts and Vice Chairman Rockefeller Issue
Statement on Intelligence Committee’s Review of Pre-War Intelligence in
Iraq," February 12, 2004.
- Transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov.news/releases/2002/08/20020826.html,
link
last visited March 21, 2008. 3
- Transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov.news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html,
link
last visited March 21, 2008.
- Transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov.news/releases/2002/10/20021007-8.html,
link
last visited March 21, 2008.
- Transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html,
link
last visited March 2 1 , 2008.
- Transcript available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2003/17300.html,
link
last visited March 21, 2008.
continued below
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| IIa
110th Congress S. Report 2nd Session SENATE 110- REPORT ON WHETHER
PUBLIC STATEMENTS REGARDING IRAQ BY U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WERE
SUBSTANTIATED BY INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION together with ADDITIONAL
AND MINORITY VIEWS June _2008. - Ordered to be
printed |
- Vulture
Capitalist, ...beware... lhe supports
limited hangout news sites like Media Matters, MoveOn.org, Huffington
Post. They don't report on reopening 911 investigation, CIA
Carnaby murder by Houston police, Israel. Russian Israeli Mob.
- Go to Iran weapons to Bosnia / Afghanistan
Muslim extremists... Clinton impeachment a smoke screen to hide this..
1998, What did Hillary know?
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| go to:news,
CIA Houston station chief gunned down by HPD.... connected to Port of
Houston security, Israel, Russia mob
|
Link Deborah Jeane
Palfrey CIA, Foggo, Wilkes, Hookergate and Gov, Bob Ehrlich ... and
Cheney,
911, Iran Attack?
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Mukasey, Schumer, Feinstein, Conflict
of Interest
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2003 State of the Union and the President’s speech in Cincinnati, are
all discussed in the Committee’s first report on pre-war Iraq
intelligence, Senate Report 108-301. The Vice President’s August 2002
speech was not reviewed by the intelligence community. Intelligence
officials have told the Committee that they could not find any evidence
that the President’s September 2002 address to the UN General Assembly
was reviewed by the intelligence community.
- (U) The Committee selected particular statements from these speeches
that pertained to eight categories: nuclear weapons, biological
weapons, chemical weapons, weapons of mass destruction (generally),
methods of delivery, links to terrorism, regime intent, and
assessments about the post-war situation in Iraq. The report is
organized along these eight categories, with each section listing the
relevant statements from the speeches.
- (U) This report does not include statements made prior to summer
2002 or statements made by officials of the United States Government
beyond the top levels of the Executive Branch. At the end of each
section, following analysis of the five speeches, the Committee has
listed additional statements by senior officials from the same time
period. Those statements that contain assertions not included in the
five major policy speeches have been examined further, to determine
whether they were substantiated by available intelligence.
- (U) To conduct this review, the Committee assembled hundreds of
intelligence reports produced prior to March 19, 2003 in an effort to
understand the state of intelligence analysis at the time of various
speeches and statements. The Committee is fully aware that officials
may have had multiple credible sources of information upon which to
base statements, but has not attempted to document or analyze source
materials other than the intelligence, since that is beyond the scope
of this report. (U) Furthermore, the Committee reviewed only finished
analytic intelligence documents, with few exceptions. This did not
include intelligence reports "from the field" or less formal
communications between intelligence agencies and other parts of the
Executive Branch.
- (U) The Committee has attempted to note where disagreements existed
within the Intelligence Community and where different reporting could
substantiate different interpretations. In order to complete this
task, however, this report focuses first on major coordinated
inter-agency intelligence reports such as National Intelligence
Estimates, Intelligence Community Assessments and Briefs, and other
consensus products. These products are not only the most
authoritative, representing the full Intelligence Community position
on the issues they cover, but also tend to be widely circulated within
the government. The Committee also examined assessments, reports and
statements to Congress from individual intelligence agencies to
address those issues for which coordinated reports were not available
or where there was disagreement among agencies.
- (U) In addition to examining the question of whether public
statements were substantiated by the underlying intelligence, the
Committee’s review also addressed the extent to which statements
were incomplete and where relevant Intelligence Community assessments
were not made part of the public discourse. A public statement that
selectively uses only that intelligence that supports a particular
policy position while ignoring or disregarding intelligence that
either weakens or contradicts the position may be accurate on its face
but present a slanted picture nonetheless.
- (U) Overlaying this issue of the selective use of intelligence is
the more fundamental issue of the selective declassification of
intelligence. Intelligence information contained in many of the
speeches analyzed in this report had to be declassified before being
released publicly. The Executive Branch has the prerogative to
classify information to protect national security, and unlike Congress
the Executive Branch can declassify information relatively easily.
Until the Congress sought and obtained the release of an unclassified
version of the key judgments of the October 2002 National Intelligence
Estimate on Iraq’s presumed weapons of mass destruction programs,
the analytical judgments of the Intelligence Community on these
matters were classified. The collected intelligence underlying these
judgments remained classified until after the invasion of Iraq. Few,
if any, of the Intelligence Community’s assessments on Iraq’s
links to terrorism, the intent of the Iraqi regime, projected post-war
conditions, or other relevant matters contained in the statements of
senior officials were publicly released before the war. This ability
of the Executive Branch to unilaterally declassify and divulge
intelligence information at a time, place, and in a manner of its
choosing must also be taken into account when evaluating policymakers’
use of intelligence information. _ 3
II. Nuclear Weapons • "The Iraqi regime has in fact been very
busy enhancing its capabilities in the field of chemical and biological
agents. And they continue to pursue the nuclear program they began so many
years ago." - Vice President Richard Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee,
August 26, 2002 •
- "But we now know that Saddam has resumed his efforts to acquire
nuclear weapons." - Vice President Richard Cheney, Nashville,
Tennessee, August 26, 2002 • "Many of us are convinced that
Saddam will acquire nuclear weapons fairly soon." - Vice
President Richard Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee, August 26, 2002 •
- "What he wants is time and more time to husband his resources,
to invest in his ongoing chemical and biological weapons programs, and
to gain possession of nuclear arms.” - Vice President Richard
Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee, August 26, 2002
- "Today, Iraq continues to withhold important information about
its nuclear program — weapons design, procurement logs, experiment
data, an accounting of nuclear materials and documentation of foreign
assistance. Iraq employs capable nuclear scientists and technicians.
It retains physical infrastructure needed to build a nuclear weapon.
Iraq has made several attempts to buy high-strength aluminum tubes
used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon. Should Iraq acquire
fissile material, it would be able to build a nuclear weapon within a
year. And Iraq’s state-controlled media has reported numerous
meetings between Saddam Hussein and his nuclear scientists, leaving
little doubt about his continued appetite for these weapons." -
President George W Bush, Address to the United Nations General
Assembly, September 12, 2002 •
- "But Saddam Hussein has defied all these efforts and continues
to develop weapons of mass destruction. The first time we may be
completely certain he has a — nuclear weapons is when, God forbids,
he uses one." - President George W Bush, Address to the United
Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002 •
- "The Iraqi regime has violated all of these obligations. It
possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons. It is seeking
nuclear weapons." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio,
October 7, 2002 •
- "The evidence indicates that Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear
weapons program. Saddam Hussein has held numerous meetings with Iraqi
nuclear scientists. . .Satellite photographs reveal that Iraq is
rebuilding facilities at sites that have been part of its nuclear
program in the past. Iraq has attempted to purchase high-strength
aluminum tubes and other equipment needed for gas centrifuges, which
are used to enrich uranium for nuclear weap0ns." - President
George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002
- "If the Iraqi regime is able to produce, buy or steal an amount
of highly enriched uranium a little larger than a single softball, it
could have a nuclear weapon in less than a year." - President
George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "Facing
clear evidence of peril we cannot wait for the final proof- the
smoking gun - that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud." -
President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 •
- "After eleven years during which we have tried containment,
sanctions, inspection, even selected military action, the end result
is that Saddam Hussein still has chemical and biological weapons and
is increasing his capabilities to make more. And he is moving ever
closer to developing a nuclear weapon." - President George W
Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 •
- "We could wait and hope that Saddam does not give weapons to
terrorists, or develop a nuclear weapon to blackmail the world. But I’m
convinced that is a hope against all evidence." - President
George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002
- "To spare himself, he agreed to systematically disarm of all
weapons of mass destruction. For the next twelve years, he
systematically violated that agreement. He pursued chemical,
biological and nuclear weapons, even while inspectors were in his
country. Nothing to date has restrained him from his pursuit of these
weapons — not economic sanctions, not isolation from the civilized
world, not even cruise missile strikes on his military
facilities." - President George W Bush, State of the Union
Address, January 29, 2003 •
- "The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein
recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa. Our
intelligence sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high—strength
aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production." ·
President George W Bush, State of the Union Address, January 29, 2003
•
- "We have no indication that Saddam Hussein has ever abandoned
his nuclear weapons program. On the contrary, we have more than a
decade of proof that he remains determined to acquire nuclear
weapons." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the
United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 •
- "Saddam Hussein is determined to get his hands on a nuclear
bomb. He is so determined that he has made repeated covert attempts to
acquire high-specification aluminum tubes from eleven different
countries, even after inspections resumed." - Secretary of State
Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February
5, 2003 •
- "By now, just about everyone has heard of these tubes and we
all know that there are differences of opinion. There is controversy
about what these tubes are for. Most U.S. experts think they are
intended to serve as rotors in centrifuges used to enrich uranium.
Other experts, and the Iraqis themselves, argue that they are really
to produce the rocket bodies for a conventional weapon, a multiple
rocket launcher." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to
the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 •
- "Intercepted communications from mid-2000 through last summer
showed that Iraq front companies sought to buy machines that can be
used to balance gas centrifuge rotors. One of these companies also had
been involved in a failed effort in 2001 to smuggle aluminum tubes
into Iraq." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the
United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 •
- "We also have intelligence from multiple sources that Iraq is
attempting to acquire magnets and high—speed balancing machines.
Both items can be used in a gas centrifuge program to enrich
uranium." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the
United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003
- (U) In major policy speeches the President, the Vice President and
the Secretary of State indicated that the Iraqi government had an
active nuclear weapons program. The President and the Secretary of
State both indicated that this nuclear weapons program had continued
even while international weapons inspectors were in Iraq. Vice
President’s Speech in Tennessee (August 26, 2002)
- (U) In the Vice President’s August 2002 speech on Iraq, he stated
that the Iraqi regime had resumed pursuit of a nuclear weapons
development program, and said "many of us are convinced that
Saddam Hussein will acquire nuclear weapons fairly soon". He also
said that "Saddam has resumed his efforts to acquire nuclear
weapons", and that the Iraqi regime "continue[s] to pursue
the nuclear program they began so many years ago."7
- (U) In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the intelligence community
produced a number of coordinated assessments regarding possible Iraqi
nuclear programs. These assessments consistently concluded that the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations
Special Commission (UNSCOM) had destroyed or neutralized Iraq’s
pre-Gulf War nuclear infrastructure, and that Iraq did not appear to
have reconstituted its nuclear weapons pro gram.8
- (U) These assessments were also consistent in assessing that Iraq
had maintained some of the intellectual capital and physical
infrastructure necessary for a nuclear weapons program, and that Iraq
continued to procure "dual-use" technologies, with both
nuclear and non-nuclear potential 7 White House Transcript, Vice
President Speaks at VFW 103'd National Convention, August 26, 2002. 8
Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee Report, Reconstitution of
Iraq ’s Nuclear Weapons Program: An Update, October 1997; National
Intelligence Council Memorandum., Current WMD Capabilities, October
1998; Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee Report,
Reconstitution of Iraq ’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Post Desert Fox,
June 1999; Intelligence Community Assessment, Iraq.· Steadily
Pursuing WMD Capabilities, December 2000; and National Intelligence
Estimate, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile
Threat Through 2015, December 2001. (These reports are summarized in
Report on the US. Intelligence Community ’s Prewar Intelligence
Assessments on Iraq, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate
Report 108-301, July 9, 2004). They agreed that if Iraq decided to
restart a nuclear weapons program, with proper foreign assistance it
could produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon within five
to seven years, and that if Iraq in some way acquired adequate fissile
material from a foreign source, it could produce a nuclear weapon
within one year. The December 2001 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)
on foreign missile developments also noted that "Recent Iraqi
procurements. . .suggest possible preparation for a renewed uranium
enrichment program,” a slight shift in the intelligence community’s
judgments, but still consistent with the judgment that Iraq did not
appear to have reconstituted its nuclear weapons program.9
- (U) The intelligence community’s collective judgment that Iraq did
not appear to have reconstituted its nuclear weapons program did not
change until the publication of the October 2002 NIE on Iraqi WMD
programs, which was the next NIE to address the topic. However, some
individual agencies shifted their perspectives before this point. In
April 2001, the CIA noted that Iraq’s attempts to purchase
high-strength aluminum tubes and other dual-use equipment suggested
that a reconstitution effort might be underway. This judgment was
included in several other CIA assessments. 10 In August 2002 the CIA
published a paper on Iraqi WMD capabilities (Iraq: Expanding WMD
Capabilities Pose Growing Threat), which concluded that these
procurement activities indicated that the Iraqi government had
restarted its nuclear weapons program. ll
- (U) The Defense Intelligence Agency produced several similar
assessments in 2002, noting in a May 2002 report that "Although
there is no firm evidence of a current nuclear weapon design effort,
we judge that continued procurement of dual-use nuclear-related items,
key personnel assigned to nuclear weapon-capable sites, construction
at nuclear facilities, and Saddam’s interactions with the Iraqi
Atomic Energy Commission all indicate that Saddam has not abandoned
the nuclear weapon pro gram."l2
- (U) The Department of Energy (DOE) disagreed with the CIA’s
conclusions regarding the aluminum tubes, and assessed that it was
more likely that the tubes were intended for a different use, such as
a conventional rocket program.13 Based on other evidence, including
Saddam’s
- 9 rm. l° Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Iraq -
Purchases Could Revive Nuclear Program (SC_No: PASS SEIB 01- 083CHX),
April 10, 2001; CIA, Iraq: New Effort to Get Centrifuge Tubes, July
2001; Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Iraq: Nuclear-Related
Procurement Efforts, October 18, 2001; Senior Executive Intelligence
Brief Iraq: Seeking to Rebuild Enrichment Capability, November 2001;
CIA, Iraq: Centrifuge-based Uranium Enrichment Program Before and
After Gulf War, November 2001; CIA Senior Executive Memorandum,
December 15, 2001; CIA, Iraq: Status of the Nuclear Program, January
11, 2002; CIA, Iraq: Status of Baghdad ’s Uranium Enrichment
Program, March 2002. UCLA, Iraq: Expanding WMD Capabilities Pose
Growing Threat, August 2002. 12 DIA EH, Baghdad apparentlv has
increased its activity at former and suspect nuclear sites, January
15, 2002; DIA Defense Intelligence Assessment, Iraq 's Weapons of Mass
Destruction and Theater Ballistic Missile Programs: Post-9-1 1
September, January 2002; DIA Information Paper, Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, April 15, 2002; DIA Information Paper, Comparison of
NBC and missiles programs in Iraq, Iran and Syria, September 10, 2002;
DIA, Iraq — Key WIMD Facilities An Operational Support Study,
September 2002; DIA, Iraq: Nuclear Program Handbook (DI-1610-81-01),
Defense Intelligence Assessment, May 2002; DIA, Iraq’s Reemerging
Nuclear Weapon Program, September 2002. B Department of Energy Daily
Intelligence Highlight, Iraq: High Strength Aluminum Tube Procurement,
April 11, 2001; Department of Energy Technical Intelligence Note, Iraq’s
Gas Centrifuge Program: Is Reconstitution Underway?, August 17, 2001.
. _ 7
meetings with Iraqi nuclear scientists, and possible attempts to
procure uranium from Niger, the DOE assessed in July 2002 that Saddam
Hussein might be attempting to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program, but
suggested that the evidence was not conclusive.14
- (U) The Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research
(State/INR) disagreed with the CIA that Iraq had restarted a nuclear
weapons program, and concurred with the DOE that the aluminum tubes
were probably intended for other purposes. This view was included in
congressional testimony in September 2002, but State/INR did not
publish any reports on the aluminum tubes outside of the State
Department until after publication of the October 2002 NIE.15 _
Several of these intelligence agencies also made reference to
assessments by the National Ground Intelligence Center (N GIC)
regarding the aluminum tubes. Testimony by the Director of Central
Intelligence to Congress stated that NGIC judged that "Iraq’s
dimensional requirements for the tubes are far stricter than necessary
for rocket casings." A later memo from State/INR said that
"the IAEA and - pertinent nuclear—technical experts have
concluded independently that the aluminum tubes are not intended for
Iraq’ s nuclear program and are consistent with rocket casings. .
.DOE and DoD’s National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) concur on
this assessment, though NGIC does not share most of the other DOE
views on tactical rockets."l6
- (U) According to a DIA report, the intelligence community continued
to assess that it would take five to seven years from the commencement
of a revived nuclear program for the Iraqi government to indigenously
produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon. This same report
repeated the assessment that a nuclear weapon could be constructed
much faster if adequate fissile material was acquired from a foreign
source, though an earlier CIA assessment noted that "we have not
detected a dedicated Iraqi effort to obtain fissile material
abroad."17 President’s Speech to the UN General Assembly
(September 12, 2002)
- (U) In the President’s address to the United Nations General
Assembly, he stated that Iraq continued to develop weapons of mass
destruction, and indicated that Iraq had an ongoing nuclear weapons
program. Specifically, he referred to Iraqi efforts to purchase
aluminum tubes, Iraqi efforts to conceal information about its
pre-Gulf War nuclear program, and meetings between Saddam Hussein and
Iraqi nuclear scientists. He noted that Iraq possessed some of the
intellectual capital and physical infrastructure that would be
necessary for a nuclear weapons program, and said that if Iraq could
"acquire iissile material, it would be able to build a nuclear
weapon within a year."18 (U) As noted above, the intelligence
community had assessed for years that while Iraq’s nuclear
infrastructure had been destroyed or neutralized by the IAEA and the
UN, Iraq still possessed some of the physical infrastructure and
scientific personnel that would be necessary for reconstituting a
nuclear weapons program. Though the intelligence community as a whole
had not yet concluded that a nuclear weapons program was underway,
some (though not all) intelligence agencies believed that Iraq’s
attempts to acquire high-strength aluminum tubes, along with
supporting evidence such as Saddam’s meetings with Iraqi nuclear
science personnel, indicated that the nuclear program was in fact
being reconstituted
- M Department of Energy Daily Intelligence Highlight,
Nuclear Reconstitution Ejforts Underway?, July 22, 2002. 15 Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence transcript of Hearing on Iraq,
September 17, 2002; Report on the US. Intelligence Community ’s
Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, Senate Report 108-301, July 9, 2004. 16 Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence transcript of Hearing on Iraq, September 17,
2002; State/INR Memorandum, Iraq: Quest for Aluminum Tubes, October 9,
2002. 17 CIA, Senior Executive Memorandum, December 15, 2001; DIA,
Iraq.· Nuclear Program Handbook (DI-1610-81- 01), Defense
Intelligence Assessment, May 2002 (citing the views of the
intelligence community). _ 8
- . (U) Intelligence community analysts generally believed that the
Iraqi govemment’s failure to provide certain evidence and documents
regarding its pre-1991 nuclear program indicated that the Iraqi governmentwas
attempting to conceal this information. However, this conclusion was
not cited by the intelligence community as compelling evidence for a
reconstituted, post-Gulf War nuclear weapons program.19
- (U) Numerous intelligence assessments made reference to open source
information showing that Saddam met with personnel from the Iraqi
Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC).2°
- (U) At the time of the President’s address to the General
Assembly, the intelligence community had not changed its judgment that
it would take Iraq at least several years to produce enough fissile
material for a nuclear weapon (‘five to seven years’ was the
commonly cited timeframe, though a September 2002 DIA report judged
that it could be done in four)2l, and that Iraq could build a nuclear
weapon within one year if it in some way acquired an adequate amount
of iissile material from a foreign source. President’s Speech in
Cincinnati (October 7, 2002)
- (U) In the President’s speech on Iraq in Cincinnati, he stated
that the Iraqi regime was "seeking nuclear weapons", and
that Saddam Hussein was "moving ever closer to developing a
nuclear weapon". He reiterated earlier statements about Saddam
holding "numerous meetings with Iraqi nuclear scientists”, and
attempting to "purchase high-strength aluminum tubes and other
equipment needed for gas centrifuges”. He also said that Iraq was
"rebui1ding facilities at sites that have been part of its
nuclear program in the 2past", and that "the evidence
indicates that Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons pro gram."2
18 White House Transcript, President’s Remarks at the United Nations
General Assembly, September 12, 2002. 19 CIA, Iraq: Continuing To
Stonewall IAEA, July 10, 1998; DIA, Iraq: Nuclear Program Handbook
(DI-1610-81- 01), Defense Intelligence Assessment, May 2002; and CIA,
Iraq: Status of the Nuclear Program, January 11, 2002. 20 DOE, Iraq:
Nuclear Reconstitution Efforts Underway? , July 22, 2002; CIA, Iraq:
Questions on Nuclear Timeline, September 11, 2002; Report on the US.
Intelligence Community 's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq,
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Report 108-301, July
9, 2004. 21 DIA, Iraq — Key WMD Facilities An Operational Support
Study, September 2002. 22 White House Transcript, President Bush
Outlines Iraqi Threat, October 7, 2002. _ 9 .... this file originally
created by NewsFollowUp.com Steve Francis on June 7, 2008.
- (U) The President also repeated his statement that if the Iraqi
regime came to possess highly emiched uranium, "it could have a
nuclear weapon in less than a year." Additionally, he suggested
that there was clear evidence that Iraq was developing a nuclear
weapon, declaring that "facing clear evidence of peril we cannot
wait for the final proof- the smoking grm — that could come in the
form of a mushroom cloud." He concluded that "we could wait
and hope that Saddam does not give weapons to terrorists, or develop a
nuclear weapon to blackmail the world. But I’m convinced that is a
hope against all evidence."23
- (U) In the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on
Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, the intelligence community
expressed the majority view (with all agencies except State/INR
concurring) that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.
This conclusion was based on three primary bodies of evidence: Iraqi
procurement attempts (primarily of aluminum tubes, but also including
other dual-use technologies, such as magnets, high-speed balancing
machines, and machine tools), apparent regime efforts to reestablish
Iraq’s cadre of weapons personnel, and apparent activity at several
suspected nuclear weapons sites.24
- (U) State/INR dissented from the majority view, and stated in the
NIE that the available evidence did "not add up to a compelling
case for reconstitution" of an Iraqi nuclear weapons program. The
DOE dissented from the majority view that the high-strength aluminum
tubes were intended for use in a nuclear program, but concurred with
the majority judgment that reconstitution was underway.25
- (U) In addition to discussing Iraqi attempts to procure aluminum
tubes and other dual-use technologies, the NIE described meetings
between Saddam Hussein and IAEC personnel. The NIE, like several
earlier DIA reports, also discussed construction at facilities that
might have nuclear applications Construction at sites known to have
been part of Iraq’s pre-Gulf War nuclear weapons program was
mentioned in earlier assessments (though not specifically in the NIE).26
- (U) State/IN`R’s altemative views, which were incorporated in the
NIE, said that State/ INR accepted "the view of technical experts
at the Department of Energy" who concluded that the aluminum
tubes were "poorly suited" for a nuclear weapons program.
The altemative views also cast doubt on the judgment that other
dual-use procurement efforts were related to a nuclear program, and
went on to say that "the information we have on Iraqi nuclear
personnel does not appear consistent with a coherent effort to
reconstitute a nuclear weapons program."27 23 rbrd. 24 National
Intelligence Estimate, Iraq 's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass
Destruction, October 2002. Committee staff were also permitted to view
a one-page summary of the NIE, which was prepared for the President.
This one-page summary stated that "INR judges that the evidence
indicates, at most, a limited Iraqi nuclear reconstitution
effort." 25 rbrd. 26 DIA, Iraq: Nuclear Program
Handbook, May 2002; DIA, Iraq’s Reemerging Nuclear Weapon Program,
September 2002; DIA, Iraq -— Key WMD Facilities An Operational
Support Study, September 2002; National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq
’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October
2002; Intelligence Community Assessment, Iraq: Steadibr Pursuing WMD
Capabilities, December 2000. 27 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq
’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October
2002. 10
- (U) The majority view of the NIE assessed that Iraq would be able to
produce a nuclear weapon in five to seven years, and posited a
"much less likely scenario" in which production time could
be shortened to three to five years. The majority view also assessed
that if Iraq acquired fissile material from an outside source that
production time could be "within several months to a year",
but noted that Iraq did not appear to have a "systematic effort
to acquire foreign fissile materials from Russia [or] other
sources." State/INR said that it could not predict when Iraq
might acquire a nuclear weapon, since it lacked persuasive evidence of
a reconstituted nuclear pro gram.28 President ’s State of the Union
Address (January 29, 2003)
- (U) In the President’s 2003 State of the Union Address, he stated
that Iraq had pursued nuclear weapons even while weapons inspectors
were in Iraq. He also said that the Iraqi regime had attempted to
purchase aluminum tubes that could be used in a nuclear program, and
that "the British government has learned that Saddam Hussein
recently sought significant quantities of uranium from
Africa."29
- (U) While the intelligence community assessed that Iraq had
initially attempted to continue its nuclear weapons program following
the imposition of post-Gulf War sanctions, most agencies believed that
the IAEA and UNSCOM had succeeded in destroying or neutralizing Iraq’s
nuclear infrastructure, and that the regime did not resume its pursuit
of nuclear weapons until December 1998, when UNSCOM inspectors left
the coruitry. As noted above, State/INR did not believe that
reconstitution had begun at all.30
- (U) The October 2002 NIE contained an annex on the high-strength
aluminum tubes. Although all the intelligence agencies agreed that the
aluminum tubes were a dual-use technology, DOE and State/INR assessed
that it was unlikely that the tubes were being used for nuclear
weapons- related purposes. Other agencies concurred with the majority
view, which cited the aluminum tubes as the primary evidence of an
ongoing nuclear weapons program. Neither the concurring nor dissenting
agencies changed their view between the publication of the NIE and the
invasion of Iraq.31
- (U) An unclassified British white paper from September 2002 had
assessed that Iraq had sought large quantities of natural
(non-enriched) uranium from Africa. This was echoed by a statement in
the NIE, which said "lraq also began vigorously trying to procure
uranium ore and yellowcake; acquiring either would shorten the time
Baghdad needs to produce nuclear weapons." This was not cited by
the NIE as key evidence for an ongoing nuclear program. State/INR’s
alternative views said that "the claims of Iraqi pursuit of
natural uranium in Africa are, in INR’s assessment, highly
dubious."
- 2* ibid. 29 White House Transcript, President
Delivers "State of the Union January 28, 2003. 30 National
Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of
Mass Destruction, October 2002; Prepared Statement of Director of
Central Intelligence George Tenet Before the Senate Armed Services
Committee and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, September
17, 2002; and Report on the UTS. Intelligence Community ’s Prewar
Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, Senate Report 108-301, July 9, 2004. 31 National
Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of
Mass Destruction, October 2002, and Report on Postwar Findings About
Iraq 's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare With
Prewar Assessments, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate
Report 109-331, September 8, 2006. _ ll
- (U) The CIA’s comments and assessments about the Iraq-Niger
uranium reporting were inconsistent, and at times contradictory,
following the publication of the NIE. Neither State/INR, nor the DIA,
nor the DOE shifted their assessments regarding this issue between the
publication of the NIE and the invasion of Iraq.33
- (U) Intelligence assessments regarding the uranium reporting and the
coordination process for the State of the Union address are discussed
in more detail in previous Committee reports. (Senate Reports 108-301
and 109-331). Secretary of State ’s Address to the UN Security
Council (February 5, 2003) (U) In the Secretary of State’s February
2003 address to the United Nations Security Council, he stated that
Saddam Hussein was detemined to acquire nuclear weapons, and argued
that Iraq had not abandoned its pre-Gulf War weapons program. He
specifically referred to Iraqi attempts to procure dual-use
technologies, including aluminum tubes, magnets, and high-speed
balancing machines.
- (U) The Secretary of State said that "most U.S. experts"
believed that the aluminum tubes were intended to be part of a nuclear
weapons program, and acknowledged that "other experts", as
well as the Iraqi government, had argued that the tubes were intended
for use in conventional rocket programs.
- (U) United States intelligence agencies continued to differ over the
intended purpose of the aluminum tubes - State/INR and the DOE
continued to disagree with the majority view and assessed that
procurement efforts were "not clearly linked to a nuclear end
use."
- (U) The intelligence community also assessed that the Iraqi
government was seeking to purchase certain other dual-use
technologies, and State/INR continued to disagree with the majority
view that these technologies were part of a nuclear weapons
program. "[T]he issue’s not inspectors. The issue is that
[Saddam Hussein] has chemical weapons and he’s used them. The issue
is that he’s developing and has biological weapons. The issue is
that he’s pursuing nuclear weapons...[H]e is actively pursuing
nuclear weapons at this time..." - Vice President Dick Cheney,
Late Edition, March 24, 2002 • (Question: Can we rule out right now
Saddam’s having a nuclear weapon?) "I would not want to give
you an intelligence judgment on that. Our best information right now
is that he is working hard on [developing nuclear weapons], but we
cannot confirm that he has one. But we are absolutely certain that he
continues to try to develop one or obtain one." - Secretary of
State Colin Powell, Fox News Sunday, September 8, 2002 • "With
respect to nuclear weapons, we are quite confident that [Saddam
Hussein] continues to try to pursue the technology that would allow
him to develop a nuclear weapon. Whether he could do it in one, five,
six or seven, eight years is something that people can debate about,
but what nobody can debate about is the fact that he still has the
incentive, he still intends to develop those kinds of weapons. "
— Secretary of State Colin Powell, Fox News Sunday, September 8,
2002 • "[Saddam] now is trying, through his illicit procurement
network, to acquire the equipment he needs to be able to enrich
uranium to make the bombs." — Vice President Dick Cheney, Meet
the Press, September 8, 2002 • "[Saddam Hussein’s] regime has
an active program to acquire and develop nuclear weapons." —
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed
Service Committee, September 18, 2002
Additional Statements 32 Joint Intelligence Committee of
the United Kingdom, Iraq ’s Weapons of Mass Destruction, September 24,
2002; National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for
Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002; Report on the US. Intelligence
Community 's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, Senate Report 108-301, July 9, 2004. 33Report
on Postwar Findings About Iraq 's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and
How They Compare With Prewar Assessments, Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, Senate Report 109-331, September 8, 2006. _ 12
- (U) The Secretary of State did not mention apparent activity at
former nuclear facilities or reports about Iraq acquiring uranium from
Africa in his address to the Security Council.
- (U) The above statements are all consistent with the five policy
speeches analyzed. The statements below differ in significant ways.
"We do know that he is actively pursuing a nuclear weapon. We do
know that there have been shipments going into Iran, for instance --
into Iraq, for instance, of aluminum tubes that really are only suited
to -- high-quality aluminum tubes that are only really suited for
nuclear weapons programs, centrifuge programs. We know that he has the
infrastructure, nuclear scientists to make a nuclear weapon." —
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Late Edition, September 8,
2002 (U) On September 8, 2002, the National Security Advisor said that
the aluminum tubes sought by Iraq "are only really suited for
nuclear weapons programs". Although both the CIA and DIA had
assessed that the aluminum tubes were intended for a nuclear weapons
program (with the CIA noting that the tubes were "best
suited" for centrifuges, and that other explanations were
"inconsistent with the total body of intelligence"), the DOE
had assessed that this was unlikely, _ 13 and had published
intelligence reports explaining why it was possible (and, in the DOE’s
view, more likely) that the tubes were intended to be used to build
conventional rockets.34 • "His regime has an active program to
acquire and develop nuclear weapons. They have the knowledge of how to
produce nuclear weapons, and designs for at least two different
nuclear devices.` They have a team of scientists, technicians and
engineers in place, as well as the infrastructure needed to build a
weapon. Very likely all they need to complete a weapon is fissile
material-and they are, at this moment, seeking that material-both from
foreign sources and the capability to produce it indigenously."
— Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the Senate
Armed Services Committee, September 19, 2002
- (U) On September 19, 2002, the Secretary of Defense stated that Iraq
possessed designs for at least two nuclear devices. He also stated
that the Iraqi government was seeking fissile material from foreign
sources. - Intelligence obtained after the Gulf War indicated that
Iraq had developed two designs for nuclear weapons. Both aparently
failed to meet key Iraqi objectives — the smaller of the two had an
estimated y and the larger of the two, which had an estimated yield of
, could not be delivered by missile.36 Although the intelligence
community did not assess that Iraq was engaged in a systematic effort
to acquire fissile material from abroad, a September 2002 DIA report
noted that "a sensitive source indicates that since inspectors
left in 1998, Iraq has been trying to acquire highly enriched
uranium."37 • "But we now have irrefutable evidence that
he has once again set up and reconstituted his program, to take
uranium, to enrich it to sufficiently high grade, so that it will
function as the base material as a nuclear weapon." - Vice
President Richard Cheney, Speech in Casper, Wyoming, September 20,
2002 (quoted by the Associated Press)
- (U) In September 2002 the Vice President stated that there was
"irrefutable evidence" that Iraq had reconstituted a nuclear
weapons program. As noted, several intelligence agencies assessed that
reconstitution was underway, but the Department of Energy assessed
that the evidence was less conclusive (State/ INR agreed with the
Department of Energy, but had not published any reports on the topic
outside of the State Department at that point). "It
is going to be cheaper and less costly to do it now than it will be to
wait a year or two years or three years until he’s developed even
more deadly weapons, perhaps nuclear weapons." — Vice President
Richard Cheney, Meet the Press, March 16, 2003 (U) In March 2003 the
Vice President suggested that it was possible that Iraq could develop
nuclear weapons within one to three years. The majority view of the
NIE concluded that unless it acquired fissile material from abroad,
Iraq probably would not be able to make a nuclear weapon for five to
seven years. The NIE described a "much less likely" scenario
in which Iraq could produce enough fissile material for a weapon in
three to five years, and also assessed that if the Iraqi regime
acquired sufficient fissile material from abroad, it could build a
weapon in "several months to a year." While most
intelligence agencies assessed that Iraq had made a few efforts to
acquire fissile material from abroad, the NIE noted that Iraq had
apparently not instituted a systematic effort to acquire foreign
fissile materials.39 • "We know that based on intelligence that
he has been very, very good at hiding these kinds of efforts. He’s
had years to get good at it and we know he has been absolutely devoted
to trying to acquire nuclear weapons. And we believe he has, in fact,
reconstituted nuclear weapons. I think Mr. El-Baradei frankly is
wrong. And I think if you look at the track record of the
International Atomic Energy Agency and this kind of issue, especially
where Iraq’s concerned, they have consistently underestimated or
missed what it was Saddam Hussein was doing. I don’t have any reason
to believe they’re any more valid this time than they’ve been in
the past." - Vice President Dick Cheney, Meet the Press, March
16, 2003
- 38 34 Department of Energy Daily Intelligence
Highlight, Iraq: High Strength Aluminum Tube Procurement, April ll,
2001; Department of Energy, Iraq 's Gas Cenmyixge Program: Is
Reconstitution Underway?, August 17, 2001, p. 12; DIA, Iraq: Nuclear
Program Handbook (DI—1 61 0-8 1 -01), Defense Intelligence
Assessment, May 2002; Department of Energy Daily Intelligence
Highlight, Nuclear Reconstitution Underway?, July 22, 2002; CIA, Iraq:
Expanding WMD Capabilities Pose Growing Threat, August 2002. 35 A
lciloton is a measure of explosive force equivalent to 1000 tons of
TNT. The atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima is generally estimated to
have exploded with a force of 12-15 kilotons. 36 The post-Gulf War
reporting is summarized in the October 2002 NIE, which was published a
few weeks after the Secretary’s testimony. 37 DIA, Iraq ’s
Reemerging Nuclear Weapons Program, September 2002. 38 Department of
Energy Daily Intelligence Highlight, Iraq: High Strength Aluminum Tube
Procurement, April 11, 2001; Department of Energy Daily Intelligence
Highlight, Nuclear Reconstitution Underway?, July 22, 2002; Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence transcript of Hearing on Iraq,
September 17, 2002. 14
- (U) In March 2003 the Vice President also said that Iraq had
reconstituted nuclear weapons. Elsewhere in the same interview he
indicated that Iraq did not yet possess nuclear weapons, and that
"it’s only a matter of time until he [Saddam Hussein] acquires
nuclear weapons." No intelligence agency ever assessed that Iraq
had reconstituted nuclear weapons. In an interview on September 13,
2003, the Vice President said that he had misspoken, and had meant to
say "nuclear weapons capability", rather than "nuclear
weapons". Conclusions (U) Conclusion 1: Statements by the
President, Vice President, Secretary of State and the National
Security Advisor regarding a possible Iraqi nuclear weapons program
were generally substantiated by intelligence community estimates, but
did not convey the substantial disagreements that existed in the
intelligence community. Prior to the October 2002 National
Intelligence Estimate, some intelligence agencies assessed that the
Iraqi government was reconstituting a nuclear weapons program, while
others disagreed or expressed doubts about the evidence. The Estimate
itself expressed the majority view that the program was being
reconstituted, but included clear dissenting views from the State
Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, which argued that
reconstitution was not underway, and the Department of Energy, which
argued that aluminum tubes sought by Iraq were probably not intended
for a nuclear program. 39 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s
Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002. _
15 Postwar Findings
- (U) Postwar findings revealed that Iraq ended its nuclear weapons
program in 1991, and that Iraq’s ability to reconstitute a nuclear
weapons program progressively declined aiier that date. The Iraq
Survey Group (ISG) found no evidence that Saddam Hussein ever
attempted to restart a nuclear weapons program, although the Group did
find that he took steps to retain the intellectual capital generated
during the program. That intellectual capital decayed between 1991 and
2003, however, and the ISG found no evidence that the relevant
scientists were involved in renewed weapons work.
- (U) Postwar findings confirmed that the high-strength aluminum tubes
sought by Iraq had been intended for a conventional rocket program,
and found no evidence that other dual-use technologies (magnets,
high-speed balancing machines, and machine tools) were intended for
use in a nuclear weapons program. Various ongoing activities at former
nuclear sites were apparently unrelated to any weapons program, and
construction observed at the al-Tahadi high- voltage and
electromagnetic facility also had no apparent connection to any
nuclear weapons program.
- (U) P4qstwar surveys found no evidence that Iraq sought uranium from
any foreign sources alter 1 991 . 40 Report on Postwar Findings About
Iraq ’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare
With Prewar Assessments, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
Senate Report 109-331, September 8, 2006. _ 16 IH. Biological
Weapons • "The Iraqi regime has in fact been very busy
enhancing its capabilities in the field of chemical and biological
agents." - Wce President Richard Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee,
August 26, 2002 • "What he wants is time and more time to
husband his resources, to invest in his ongoing chemical and
biological weapons programs, and to gain possession of nuclear
arms." - Vice President Richard Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee,
August 26, 2002 • "Right now, Iraq is expanding and improving
facilities that were used for the production of biological
weapons." - President George W Bush, Address to the United
Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002 • "Eleven years
ago, as a condition for ending the Persian Gulf War, the Iraqi regime
was required to destroy its weapons of mass destruction, to cease all
development of such weapons, and to stop all support for terrorist
groups. The Iraqi regime has violated all of those obligations. It
possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons." -
President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 •
"Ir1 1995, after several years of deceit by the Iraqi regime, the
head of Iraq’s military industries defected. It was then that the
regime was forced to admit that it had produced more than 30,000
liters of anthrax and other deadly biological agents. The inspectors,
however, concluded that Iraq had likely produced two to four times
that amount. This is a massive stockpile of biological weapons that
has never been accounted for, and capable of killing millions." -
President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 •
"And surveillance photos reveal that the regime is rebuilding
facilities that it had used to produce chemical and biological
weapons. Every chemical and biological weapon that Iraq has or makes
is a direct violation of the truce that ended the Persian Gulf War in
1991. Yet, Saddam Hussein has chosen to build and keep these weapons
despite international sanctions, U.N. demands, and isolation from the
civilized world." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio,
October 7, 2002 • "After eleven years during which we have
tried containment, sanctions, inspections, even selected military
action, the end result is that Saddam Hussein still has chemical and
biological weapons, and is increasing his capabilities to make
more." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7,
2002 • "Twelve years ago, Saddam Hussein faced the prospect of
being the last casualty in a war he had started and lost. To spare
himself, he agreed to disarm of all weapons of mass destruction. For
the next 12 years, he systematically violated that agreement. He
pursued chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, even while
inspectors were in his country. Nothing to date has restrained him
from his pursuit of these weapons — not economic sanctions, not
isolation from the civilized world, not even cruise missile
strikes
- page 17
- on his military facilities." — President George W Bush, State
of the Union Address, January 28, 2003 • "From three Iraqi
defectors we know that Iraq, in the late l990s, had several mobile
biological weapons labs. These are designed to produce germ warfare
agents, and can be moved from place to a place to evade inspections.
Saddam Hussein has not disclosed these facilities. He’s given no
evidence that he has destroyed them." — President George W
Bush, State of the Union Address, January 28, 2003 • "We know,
we know from sources that a missile brigade outside Baghdad was
dispersing rocket launchers and warheads containing biological warfare
agent to various locations, distributing them to various locations in
western Iraq .... Most of the launchers and warheads had been hidden
in large groves of palm trees and were to be moved every one to four
weeks to escape detection." - Secretary of State Colin Powell,
Speech to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003. •
"One of the most worrisome things that emerges from the thick
intelligence file we have on Iraq’s biological weapons is the
existence of mobile production facilities used to make biological
agents." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Speech to the United
Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003. • "Let me take you
inside that intelligence file and share with you what we know from
eyewitness accounts. We have first-hand descriptions of biological
weapons factories on wheels and on rails." - Secretary of State
Colin Powell, Speech to the United Nations Security Council, February
5, 2003. • "The trucks and train cars are easily moved and are
designed to evade detection by inspectors. In a matter of months, they
can produce a quantity of biological poison equal to the entire amount
that Iraq claimed to have produced in the years prior to the Gulf
War." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Speech to the United
Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003. • "Although Iraq’s
mobile production program began in the mid-1990s, UN inspectors at the
time only had vague hints of such programs. Confirmation came later,
in the year 2000. The source was an eyewitness, an Iraqi chemical
engineer who supervised one of these facilities. He actually was
present during biological agent production runs. He was also at the
site when an accident occurred in 1998. l2 technicians died from
exposure to biological agents." - Secretary of State Colin
Powell, Speech to the United Nations Security Council, February 5,
2003. • "A second source. An Iraqi civil engineer in a position
to know the details of the program confirmed the existence of
transportable facilities moving on trailers." - Secretary of
State Colin Powell, Speech to the United Nations Security Council,
February 5, 2003. • "A third source, also in a position to
know, reported in summer, 2002, that Iraq had manufactured mobile
production systems mounted on road-trailer units and on rail
cars."
- page 18
- - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Speech to the United Nations
Security Council, February 5, 2003. • "Finally, a fourth
source. An Iraqi major who defected confirmed that Iraq has mobile
biological research laboratories in addition to the production
facilities I mentioned earlier." - Secretary of State Colin
Powell, Speech to the United Nations Security Council, February 5,
2003. • "We know that Iraq has at least seven of these mobile,
biological agent factories." - Secretary of State Colin Powell,
Speech to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003. •
"Ladies and gentlemen, these are sophisticated facilities. For
example, they can produce anthrax and botulinum toxin. In fact, they
can produce enough dry, biological agent in a single month to kill
thousands upon thousands of people." - Secretary of State Colin
Powell, Speech to the United Nations Security Council, February 5,
2003. • "Saddam Hussein has investigated dozens of biological
agents causing diseases such as gas gangrene, plague, typhus, tetanus,
cholera, camelpox, and hemorrhagic fever. And he also has the
wherewithal to develop smallpox." - Secretary of State Colin
Powell, Speech to the United Nations Security Council, February 5,
2003. • "There can be no doubt that Saddam Hussein has
biological weapons and the capability to rapidly produce more, many
more. And he has the ability to dispense these lethal poisons and
diseases in ways that can cause massive death and destruction." -
Secretary of State Colin Powell, Speech to the United Nations Security
Council, February 5, 2003. • "We also have sources who tell us
that since the l980s, Saddam’s regime has been experimenting on
human beings to perfect its biological or chemical weapons." -
Secretary of State Colin Powell, Speech to the United Nations Security
Council, February 5, 2003. Vice President ’s Speech in Tennessee
(August 26, 2002)
- (U) The Vice President’s speech stated generally that Iraq had
been "enhancing its capabilities in the field of’ biological
agents and that Saddam Hussein wanted "time and more time to
husband his resources [and] to invest in his ongoing biological
weapons programs."
- (U) The intelligence community produced a number of coordinated and
single-agency reports on Iraq’s biological weapons program after
United Nations inspectors left Iraq in the l990s. One such report was
the December 2000 Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) on Iraq’s
weapons of mass destruction programs. The ICA noted that "Our
main judgment about what _
page 19
- remains of Iraq’s original WMD programs, agents stockpiles, and
delivery systems have changed little: Iraq retains stockpiles of
chemical and biological agents and munitions."44 - The ICA also
judged that Iraq had largely rebuilt its biological weapons facilities
that raised ana1ysts’ concern about Iraq’s intentions, but could
not determine "whether Iraq is diverting these or other of its
many pharmaceutical, vaccine, or pesticide plants to produce BW
agents." Similarly, the ICA reported that _ Iraq had built a new
castor oil plant that "could easily" be used to produce the
toxin ricin.
- (U) Consistent with most contemporaneous intelligence reports, the
ICA reported that UN inspectors, and the intelligence community, did
not believe that Iraq had destroyed its previous biological weapons
and agent. It also assessed that Iraq had "taken steps to
bolster" its biological weapons research and development
program.
- (U) While the Vice President’s speech did not reference the mobile
biological laboratories, the biological weapons section of the ICA
began with such biological weapons production plants. This portion of
the ICA was based on "credible US military reporting from a
single source" who was described in the Committee’s previous
report as being the asylum seeker codenamed "CU`RVEBALL."42
The ICA, like other finished intelligence at the time, did not cite
the source by name. The ICA cited this source as saying that Iraq had
"developed a clandestine production capability ... which has the
potential to turn out several hundred tons of unconcentrated BW agent
per year." According to the source, Iraq had constructed seven
transportable biological weapons plants.
- (U) An August 10, 2001 CIA assessment, Developing Biological Weapons
as a Strategic Deterrent, stated that "Iraq is attempting to
address its regional security concerns by developing weapons of mass
destruction and is focusing on biological warfare (BW) agents as a
strategic deterrent to its enemies’ conventional and non-
conventional forces." The agency assessed that "Iraq does
not require outside assistance to produce BW, which can be easily
hidden from weapons inspectors and national technical collection
means." The paper also said, "we assess Baghdad already has
a thriving biological weapons program to augment any stockpiles it hid
from weapons inspectors."43
- (U) A December 15, 2001 CIA report, The Iraqi Threat, stated that
"Iraq maintains an active and capable BW program that includes
research, production, and weaponization of BW agents." The paper
assessed that anthrax and botulinum were the most likely candidate
agents for weaponization.44
- (U) An August 2002 DIA assessment, Iraq: Biological Wagfare Program
Handbook, judged that: 44 December 2000 Intelligence Community
Assessment,
- (U) Iraq: Steadily Pursuing WMD Capabilities. ICA 2000- 007HCX. 42
See Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, US. Intelligence
Community ’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, July 2004, p.
144. 43 August 10, 2001 CIA intelligence assessment, Developing
Biological Weapons as a Strategic Deterrent (CLAINESAF IA 2001-200721)
44 A December 15, 2001 SPWR, The Iraqi Threat (SPWRl2l501-07) _
- page 20
- Iraq is assessed to have an active BW research and development
program. Baghdad has reportedly rebuilt its full offensive BW program
in well-concealed, underground, mobile or difficult-to-locate
facilities applying lessons learned during the former UNSCOM
inspection process to prevent penetration by foreign intelligence
services. The Iraqi biological warfare (BW) program is assessed to
continue today despite Iraq’s claims to have destroyed its BW agents
and weapons completely in 1991. Numerous sources have stated that Iraq
still has stockpiles of BW agents. DIA cannot rule out Iraqi
possession of agents produced before or during Operation Desert Storm
or in the years since the Gulf War.
- (U) This DIA paper also repeated assessments that Iraq "may
retain" biological weapons munitions; that it "has
maintained or developed the indigenous capability to almost completely
support its BW program;" and that Iraq did not adequately
cooperate with UN inspectors.45 President’s Speech to the UN
General Assembly (September 12, 2002) (U) The President commented in
his September 2002 speech to the United Nations that "Iraq is
expanding and improving facilities that were used for the production
of biological weapons."
- (U) This statement is consistent with those in the Vice President’s
August 2002 speech described above. President’s Speech in Cincinnati
(October Z 2002)
- (U) The President’s Cincinnati speech included statements that
Iraq "possesses and produces" biological weapons and
mentioned "surveillance photos" of rebuilt facilities. He
cited Iraqi admissions that it had previously produced more than
30,000 liters of biological agents, and that UN inspectors’ views
were that Iraq "likely produced two to four times that
amount" that had not been accounted for. The President also
stated that Saddam Hussein was "increasing his capabilities to
make more" such weapons.
- (U) The October 2002 Iraq weapons of mass destruction NIE was issued
shortly prior to the Cincinnati speech. It represented a shift in the
IC’s judgments about Iraq’s biological weapons program from what
had been presented in previous reports, and did not contain the
uncertainties that were expressed in previous IC assessments about
what was known about the BW program.46 The NIE’s key judgments were
that all key elements of Iraq’s biological weapons program were
active and more advanced than before the Gulf War. The judgments
specically stated that: 45 August 2002 DIA assessment, Iraq:
Biological Warfare Program Handbook (DI-1650-63-02). 46 For more
discussion on the changes between the 2002 NIE and previous reports,
see Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, UTS. Intelligence
Community ’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, July 2004.
_
page 21
- We judge Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents and is
capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents,
including anthrax, for delivery by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers,
and covert operatives (emphasis added); • Baghdad has established a
large-scale, redundant, and concealed BW agent production capability;
and • Baghdad has mobile facilities for producing bacterial and
toxin BW agents; these facilities can evade detection and are highly
survivable. Within several days these units probably could produce an
amount of agent equal to the total that Iraq produced in the years
prior to the Gulf war.47
- (U) The body of the NIE noted that "Iraq’s BW program,
however, continues to be difficult to penetrate and access" and
stated that "we do not have specific information on the types of
weapons, agent, or stockpiles Baghdad has at its disposal."48 (U)
The NIE included a passage that "Only after UNSCOM confronted
Baghdad with irrefutable evidence of excessive growth media
procurement did Iraq admit that it had an offensive BW program and had
made 30,000 liters of concentrated biological weapons agents. Even
then, UNSCOM estimates that Iraq’s production of anthrax spores and
botulinum toxin could have been two to four times higher than claimed
by Baghdad."49
- (U) The President’s statement on "surveillance photos"
of rebuilt facilities was not specific, but the October 2002 NIE
included two images of possible BW facilities and text that those, and
other, facilities had been renovated or expanded.
- (U) Other assessments produced by the Intelligence Community prior
to the President’s speech also contained assessments that Iraq
possessed and was producing biological weapons and was . increasing
its capabilities in this regard. President’s State of the Union
Address (January 28, 2003)
- (U) In this speech, the President repeated the statement that Iraq
had pursued biological weapons and continued to do S0. These
statements are consistent with those discussed above.
- (U) Two notable intelligence products on Iraq’s biological weapons
program were issued between the President’s Cincinnati speech and
the State of the Union address. A November l3, 2002 CIA report
assessed that "Baghdad has a broad range of lethal and
incapacitating agents .... Iraq probably possesses at least 20 to 25
different microbes or toxins for possible BW use."5° Another CIA
paper, produced on January 18, 2003, repeated the central themes of
the October 47 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing
Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October l,
2002, pp. 6-7. *8 Ibid, at 36. 49 While not from a finished
intelligence product, a briefing book prepared by the CIA in May 2002
for the Principles’ Committee of the National Security Council said
that "Iraq probably produced 2-to-4 times the amount of BW agent
it claimed to the UN." 50 Iraq: Biological Warfare Agents Pose
Growing Threat to US Interests (CIAWIZNPAC IA 2002-060CX), _
page 22
- NIE and stated that "We judge Iraq has some lethal and
incapacitating BW agents and could quickly produce and weaponize many,
including botulinum toxin and anthrax, for delivery by bombs,
missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives."5 1 Mobile
Biological Weapons Laboratories
- (U) Unlike his speeches discussed above, President Bush referred in
the State of the Union to Iraq’s mobile biological weapons
laboratories. Citing three Iraqi defectors, the President said that
"in the late 1990s, Iraq had several mobile biological weapons
labs. These are designed to produce germ warfare agents, and can be
moved from place to a place to evade inspections."
- (U) As was described above, the intelligence community had reporting
starting in March 2000 on Iraq’s purported mobile biological weapons
labs from the Iraqi asylum seeker known as CURVE BALL. The information
came to the Defense Intelligence Agency through its relationship with
a liaison service that interviewed CURVE BALL.
- (U) Finished intelligence reporting on Iraq’s mobile biological
laboratories began in the spring of 2000 and continued through the
beginning of the war. The DIA and CIA each wrote numerous reports. One
early exarnple was a May 19, 2000 DIA report, Iraq: Biological Warfare
Program, which stated, in part: Baghdad reportedly has developed
mobile biological agent production facilities to mask ongoing
production efforts. This project, allegedly the most ambitious BW-
related Iraqi denial-and-deception effort thus far, will complicate
identifying Iraq’s offensive BW infrastructure. 2
- (U) Similar reports were issued through 2000, with a December 2000
NIE, Worldwide Biological Wadfare Programs: Trends and Prospects -
Update, that noted: Earlier this year, credible reporting described
construction of transportable BW agent production plants, BW agent
production in some of these mobile plants, and maintenance of other
fixed BW production facilities. We assess this reporting to be
credible because of the speciicity of the source’s information and
the fact that much of it has been corroborated by other intelligence.
Although we cannot confirm that BW agent production is under way at
this time, the existence of transportable BW agent plants and other
fixed facilities gives Iraq the capability to produce BW agents on
demand. 51 January 18, 2003 SPWR, Terrorism: CBRN
Capabilities of Al-Qa ’ida and Iraq and the Poison Network in
Northeastern Iran, Including Botulinum Toxin Ejforts (SPWR01 1803-09)
52 May 19, 2000 DLA Military Intelligence Digest entitled, Iraq:
Biological Warfare Program. _
- page 23
- (U) A December 14, 2000 joint report by the DCI Nonproliferation
Center, the National Imagery Mapping agency (N IMA, now known as the
National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, or NGA), and the DIA
entitled, New Evidence of Continuing Iraq Biological Warfare,53
stated: A source seeking asylum in the West has provided details of a
continuing offensive bio- logical warfare (BW) program in Iraq. The
source described not only maintenance of known BW-related facilities
but also construction of transportable BW agent production plants and
production of BW agents in these plants beginning in 1997. Although we
cannot confirm that BW agent production is under way, the Intelligence
Community (IC) assesses this reporting to be credible because the
source has provided a wealth of specific detail, much of which we have
been able to corroborate with other intelligence. This Defense Humint
Service reporting has provided significant insights into many facets
of Iraq’s BW program. Despite a decade of international efforts to
disarm Iraq, the new information suggests that Baghdad has continued
its offensive BW program by establishing a large-scale, redundant, and
concealed BW agent production capability.
- (U) An October 10, 2001 CIA assessment estimated that the mobile
laboratories could "far exceed the approximately 300,000 liters
of unconcentrated agent it declared to have produced during the entire
length of its BW program before the Gulf war."54 (U) The reports
on Iraq’s mobile laboratories were primarily based on CURVE BALL,
but some referred to corroborating sources or intelligence. In April
2002, Vanity Fair wrote an article on one of the sources, Iraqi Major
General al-Assaf. This article, perhaps along with other public events
involving this source, prompted two April CIA papers. The first stated
that the "[t]he defector passed a DIA-administered polygraph, but
the DIA debriefer expressed concem that Al- Assaf was being coached by
INC [the Iraqi National Congress] to further its political
agenda."55 The second report noted that "[the
Defense HUMINT Service; terminated contact with al-Assaf after four
sessions because of suspicions he was a fabricator." 6 Al-Assaf
was determined by DIA to be a fabricator in May 2002. The agency
issued a fabrication notice saying that "his information is
assessed as unreliable and, in some instances, pure fabrication."
53 December 14, 2000 DCI special intelligence report, New Evidence of
Continuing Iraqi Biological Warfare Program (DCINPC SIR 2000-003 X) 54
October 10, 2001 CIA WTNPAC intelligence assessment, Mobile Biological
Warfare Agent Production Capability (CLAWINPAC IA 2001-050 X) 55 April
8, 2002, CIA SPWR, Iraqi defector in the New YorkDaily News Article,
SPWR040802-01. 56 The report also noted that "The British Secret
Intelligence Service (SIS) also debriefed al-Assaf and assessed that
he fabricated at least some of his information" but indicated
that "another defector, deemed credible by the Intelligence
Community, has provided more detailed information on Iraq’s
development of mobile BW production facilities." April 22, 2002,
CIA SPWR, Assessment of the Iraqi defector Cited in the Vanity Fair
article on Iraqi WMD, SPWR042202-02. The first report stated that
Assaf" s reporting "may be accurate" and the second
stated that it was "plausible but lacks specifics." Both
reports indicated that Assaf could have obtained this information from
public sources.
page 24
- (U) Despite the fabrication notice, the October 2002 Iraq WMD NIE cited
four sources (not three as was included in the President’s speech the
following January) of the mobile biological lab intelligence, including
al-Assaf by name.
- (U) The October 2002 NIE said, "Baghdad has mobile
facilities for producing bacterial and toxin BW agents; these facilities
can evade detection and are highly survivable. Within several days these
units probably could produce an amount of agent equal to the total that
Iraq produced in the years prior to the Gulf war." The NIE also said,
"an Iraqi defector deemed credible by the IC said seven mobile BW
production units were constructed and that one began production as early
as l997."57
- (U) Prior to the President’s address, some CIA
operations officers had doubts about the credibility of CURVE BALL and
debated the point at high levels within the Directorate of Operations.
Additionally, on December 20, 2002, the Chief of the relevant station
cabled CIA headquarters to describe a meeting that day with the head of
the foreign intelligence service handling CURVE BALL. The cable summarized
the meeting and noted that the head of the service wrote a letter to the
DCI to the effect that CURVEBALL’s reporting on mobile facilities
"has not been veriiied." The CIA station did not send the actual
letter from the head of the foreign intelligence service to CIA
headquarters until February 5, 2003. On January 27, 2003, the same Chief
of Station cautioned CIA headquarters in another cable to "take the
most serious consideration" before using CURVEBALL’s information
publicly. The Committee has found no evidence that then-Director Tenet or
policymakers were informed of the doubts that some Intelligence Community
officers had about CURVEBALL’s reliability or about concerns with using
CURVEBALL’s information publicly. Secretary of State ’s Address t0 the
UN Security Council (February 5, 2003)
- (U) Secretary Powell’s
presentation delved into greater detail on Iraq’s biological weapons
program and capabilities. He said there "can be no doubt" that
Iraq possessed biological weapons and discussed their means for delivery.
He stated that rocket launchers and warheads containing biological warfare
agent were dispersed to various locations, many of them hidden in large
groves of palm trees, and moved every one to four weeks to escape
detection.
- (U) Secretary Powell described the mobile labs in great detail.
He cited sources with "iirst-hand descriptions" of the
factories, and described four human sources in terms of their professions
and access to the information. Powell stated that the labs — "at
least seven" in number — on truck and rail cars "can produce a
quantity of biological poison equal to the entire amount that Iraq claimed
to have produced in the years prior to the Gulf War."
- (U) Secretary
Powell specified that the mobile labs can produce anthrax and botulinum
toxin, and that overall, "Saddam Hussein has investigated dozens of
biological agents causing diseases such as gas gangrene, plague, typhus,
tetanus, cholera, camelpox, and hemorrhagic fever. And he also has the
wherewithal to develop smallpox." 57 The National Intelligence
Council subsequently notified recipients of the NIE that the term
"several days" was an error and should be replaced with "three
to six months."
page 25
- (U) Finally, Powell referenced human sources that told the intelligence
community that Iraq had experimented with biological weapons on human
beings. (U) In addition to the intelligence assessments described above,
reports relevant to whether specific claims in the February 5 speech were
substantiated by the intelligence are described below.
- (U) The DIA issued
a report in February 2003, Iraq: Denial and Deception: Iraqi
Countertargeting Strategy, that stated it was standard denial and
deception practice for Iraq to place various military hardware in, among
other things, "palm and date tree groves. . .," but this report
was issued after Secretary Powe11’s speech and did not mention
biological weapons. There was operational intelligence traffic on this
issue prior to the Secretary’s speech, but the Committee is not aware of
prior analytical assessments.
- (U) The number of mobile labs — "at
least seven" — was included in, among other reports, the December
2000 ICA and October 2002 NIE as described above. Multiple reports
described seven mobile production facilities and provided schematic
details on two- or three-railcar systems.
- (U) Secretary Powell stated that
Iraq has investigated dozens of biological agents, and named eight
specifically. All eight were included, along with 13 others, in a list in
the October 2002 NIE entitled, "BW Agents that Iraq has
researched." A report produced by CIA WINPAC on November 13, 2002
said that "Iraq probably possesses at least 20 to 25 different
microbes or toxins for possible BW use."58 The same report had noted
that Iraq ‘°has the capability to produce sufficient quantities [of
smallpox] for use in various delivery systems."59 Numerous other
intelligence assessments discussed Iraq’s capability to produce smallpox
and other biological agents.
- (U) On the topic of human testing, the
October 2002 NIE stated that "A former Directorate of General
Security officer said that 1,600 death row prisoners in 1995 were
transferred "to the Haditha area" for CBW testing-—probably to
the Qadisiyah complex—from Baghdad prisons. Inmate transfer files from 1995 were missing during UNSCOM inspections of the Baghdad prisons
in 1998, adding weight to the source’s claim." Additional
Statements • "So, we know that he has stored the biological
weapons. We know that he has used chemical weapons. And we know that he
has looked for ways to weaponize those and I deliver them. — National
Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Late Edition, September 8, 2002 58
November 13, 2002 CIA WINPAC assessment, Iraq: Biological Warfare Agents
Pose Growing Threat to US Interests (CIAWINPAC IA 2002-060CX). 59 ibid. _
page 26
- "But I can say obviously that they have had an enormous
appetite for weapons, biological weapons and chemical weapons. They’ve
taken these capabilities and weaponized them. They are continuing to do so
today. They are looking not only at a variety of biological capabilities,
but at a variety of ways of dispensing or weaponizing them so that they
have a range of choices with respect to it." — Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee,
September 18, 2002 • "His regime has amassed large clandestine
stocks of biological weapons, including anthrax and botulinim toxin and
possibly smallpox. — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony
before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002. •
"They have amassed large clandestine stocks of biological weapons
including anthrax and possibly smallpox." — Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld, Atlanta Chamber of Commerce, September 27, 2002 - •
"[The Iraqi declaration has] no information about Iraq’s mobile
biological-weapons production facilities. And, very disturbingly, Iraq has
not accounted for some two tons of anthrax growth media." — Deputy
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Address to Council on Foreign
Relations, January 1, 2003 • "The December 7, 2002 declaration was
padded with reams of extraneous material, but failed to address scores of
questions pending since 1998. It seeks to deceive when it says that Iraq
has no ongoing WMD programs. Illustrative examples — but not a complete
list — of Iraq’s omissions identified as issues by UNSCOM include
...tens of thousands of liters of unaccounted biological agents." —
President George W Bush, Report on Matters Relevant to the Authorization
for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, January 20,
2003 • "Where is the evidence that Iraq has destroyed the tens of
thousands of liters of anthrax and botulinum we know it had before it
expelled the previous inspectors? This isn’t an American determination.
This is the detennination of previous inspectors... What happened to the
three metric tons of growth material that Iraq imported which can be used
for producing early, in very rapid fashion, deadly biological agents?
Where the mobile vans that are nothing more than biological laboratories
on wheels?" — Secretary of State Colin Powell, remarks at the World
Economic Forum, January 26, 2003 -• Firsthand witnesses have informed us
that Iraq has at least seven mobile factories for the production of
biological agents -— equipment mounted on trucks and rails to evade
discovery. — President Bush, February 8, 2003, Radio address
- (U) These
statements were consistent with the intelligence described above.
Conclusions _ 27
- (U) Conclusion 2: Statements in the major speeches analyzed, as well
additional statements, regarding Iraq’s possession of biological agent,
weapons, production capability, and use of mobile biological laboratories
were substantiated by intelligence information. Intelligence assessments
from the late l990s through early 2003 consistently stated that Iraq
retained biological warfare agent and the capability to produce more.
Assessments on the mobile facilities included the production capabilities
of those labs, both in terms of type of agent and in amount. Prior to the
October 2002 NIE, some intelligence assessments left open the question as
to whether Iraq possessed biological weapons or that it was actively
producing them, though other assessments did not present such
uncertainties. Policymakers did not discuss intelligence gaps in Iraq’s
biological weapons programs, which were explicit in the October 2002 NIE.
Postwar Intelligence
- (U) The postwar review by the Iraq Survey Group (ISG)
determined that Iraq was not conducting biological weapons production on
research after 1996.60 The ISG determined that depending on its scale,
Iraq could have re-established an elementary BW program within a few weeks
to months of a decision to do so, but found no indications that Iraq was
pursuing this option.61
- (U) The ISG found "no evidence that Iraq
possessed, or was developing BW agent production systems mounted on road
vehicles or railway wagons."62
- (U) The Committee’s report,
"Postwar Findings About Iraq’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism
and How They Compare with Prewar Assessments" described the postwar
findings on CURVE BALL. It noted that the ISG "harbors severe doubts
about the source’s credibility." The CIA and DIA issued a joint
congressional notification in June 2004 noting that CURVE BALL was
assessed to have fabricated his claimed access to a mobile BW production
project and that his reporting had been recalled.63 ET Comprehensive
Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, Biological
Section, p. l. Ibid, p.2. 62 rnd. 63 CIA and DIA Congressional Affairs
Notification, June 7, 2004
page 28
- IV. Chemical Weapons • "The lraqi regime has in fact been very
busy enhancing its capabilities in the field of chemical and biological
agents. And they continue to pursue the nuclear program they began so many
years ago." - Vice President Richard Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee,
August 26, 2002 • "What he wants is time and more time to husband
his resources, to invest in his ongoing chemical and biological weapons
programs, and to gain possession of nuclear arms." - Vice President
Richard Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee, August 26, 2002 • "United
Nations’ inspections also revealed that lraq likely maintains stockpiles
of VX, ` mustard and other chemical agents, and that the regime is
rebuilding and expanding facilities capable of producing chemical
weapons." - President George W Bush, Address to the United Nations
General Assembly, September 12, 2002 • "We know that the regime has
produced thousands of tons of chemical agents, including mustard gas,
sarin nerve gas, VX nerve gas. Saddam Hussein also has experience in using
chemical weapons. He has ordered chemical attacks on lran, and on more
than forty villages in his own country. These actions killed or injured at
least 20,000 people, more than six times the number of people who died in
the attacks of September the 11th." — President George W. Bush,
Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "Eleven years ago, as a
condition for ending the Persian Gulf War, the Iraqi regime was required
to destroy its weapons of mass destruction, to cease all development of
such weapons, and to stop all support for terrorist groups. The lraqi
regime has violated all of those obligations. lt possesses and produces
chemical and biological weapons." - President George W Bush,
Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "And surveillance photos reveal
that the regime is rebuilding facilities that it had used to produce
chemical and biological weapons. Every chemical and biological weapon that
lraq has or makes is a direct violation of the truce that ended the
Persian Gulf War in 1991. Yet, Saddam Hussein has chosen to build and keep
these weapons despite intemational sanctions, U.N. demands, and isolation
from the civilized world." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati,
Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "After eleven years during which we have
tried containment, sanctions, inspections, even selected military action,
the end result is that Saddam Hussein still has chemical and biological
weapons, and is increasing his capabilities to make more." -
President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 •
"Twelve years ago, Saddam Hussein faced the prospect of being the
last casualty in a war he had started and lost. To spare himself, he
agreed to disarm of (sic) all weapons of mass destruction. For the next 12
years, he systematically violated that agreement. He pursued chemical,
biological, and nuclear weapons, even while inspectors were in his
country. Nothing to date has restrained him from his pursuit of these
weapons — not
page 29
- economic sanctions, not isolation from the civilized world, not even
cruise missile strikes on his military facilities. " — President
George W Bush, State of the Union Address, January 28, 2003 • "Our
intelligence officials estimate that Saddam Hussein had the materials to
produce as much as 500 tons of sarin, mustard and VX nerve agent. In such
quantities, these chemical agents could also kill untold thousands. He’s
not accounted for these materials. He has given no evidence that he has
destroyed them." — President George W Bush, State of the Union
Address, January 28, 2003 • U.S. intelligence indicates that Saddam
Hussein had upwards of 30,000 munitions capable of delivering chemical
agents. Inspectors recently turned up sixteen of them — despite Iraq’s
recent declaration denying their existence. Saddam Hussein has not
accounted for the remaining 29,984 of these prohibited munitions. He’s
given no evidence that he has destroyed them." - President George W
Bush, State of the Union Address, January 28, 2003 • "We know that
Iraq has embedded key portions of its illicit chemical weapons
infrastructure within its legitimate civilian industry." - Secretary
of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council,
February 5, 2003 • "Under the guise of dual-use infrastructure,
Iraq has undertaken an effort to reconstitute facilities that were closely
associated with its past program to develop and produce chemical
weapons." — Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United
Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "Iraq’s procurement
efforts include: equipment that can filter and separate A microorganisms
and toxins involved in biological weapons; equipment that can be used to
concentrate the agent; growth media that can be used to continue producing
anthrax and botulinum toxin; sterilization equipment for laboratories;
glass-lined reactors and specialty pumps that can handle corrosive
chemical weapons agents and precursors; large amounts of thionyl chloride,
a precursor for nerve and blister agents; and other chemicals such as
sodium sulfide, an important mustard agent precursor." - Secretary of
State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council,
February 5, 2003 • "Our conservative estimate is that Iraq today
has a stockpile of between 100 and 500 tons of chemical weapons agent.
That is enough agent to fill 16,000 battlefield rockets. Even the low end
of 100 tons of agent would enable Saddam Hussein to cause mass casualties
across more than 100 square miles of territory, an area nearly five times
the size of Manhattan.” - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to
the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "Saddam
Hussein has chemical weapons. Saddam Hussein has used such weapons. And
Saddam Hussein has no compunction about using them again — against his
neighbors and against his own people. And we have sources who tell us that
he recently has authorized his field commanders to use them. He wouldn’t
be passing out the orders if he didn’t
page 30
- _ have the weapons or the intent to use them." - Secretary of
State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council,
February 5, 2003 • "We also have sources who tell us that since the
1980s, Saddam’s regime has been experimenting on human beings to perfect
its biological or chemical weapons." - Secretary of State Colin
Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003
Vice President ’s Speech in Tennessee Mugust 26, 2002)
- (U) In the Vice
President’s August 2002 speech on Iraq, he stated that Iraq has been
"busy enhancing its capabilities in the iield of chemical"
agents and that Saddam Hussein wanted "time and more time to husband
his resources [and] to invest in his ongoing chemical" weapons
program.
- (U) The Committee reviewed prewar intelligence assessments in its
July 2004 report, US. Intelligence Community 's Prewar Intelligence
Assessments on Iraq. That report described a December 2000 Intelligence
Community Assessment (ICA), Iraq: Steadily Pursuing WMD Capabilities,
which represented the iirst comprehensive, coordinated report on all
aspects of Iraq’s WMD capabilities since United Nations (UN) inspectors
departed Iraq.
- (U) The ICA stated that "Iraq’s expansion of its
chemical industry is intended to support CW production" but that
"we have seen no indication since the Gulf War that Iraq has engaged
in large-scale production of CW agents, but we cannot rule out that
small-scale production has occurred."
- (U) The ICA judged that
"We believe that Iraq has chemical agent and stable intermediaries in
bulk storage, production equipment, and iilled munitions that are still
militarily useful." And that "[w]e assess the size of the CW
agent stockpile to be 100 tons or less. We are uncertain about the extent
and condition of Iraq’s stockpile, although we believe mustard agent-
and to a lesser degree G-agents Sarin and VX — and related munitions
probably are key components." The ICA noted that the available
intelligence "suggests that a small portion of Iraq’s prewar
stockpile of iilled munitions remains. Iraq also retains the capability to
produce many types of weapons that could be filled with chemical
agents." - The intelligence produced between the December 2000 ICA
and the Vice President’s August 2002 speech tended to reiterate and
confirm the ICA views. For example, a December 14, 2001 DIA assessment
stated that "Saddam Hussein will continue to pursue a chemical weapons
(CW) program to help ensure his personal survival and the survival of his
regime, and to increase respect for Iraq as a regional power." It
also stated that "Iraq is assessed to hold 100 metric tons of
chemical agents or less in bulk storage and filled munitions."64 The
same assessment noted that DIA cannot confirm whether Iraq is currently
producing chemical agents, or whether Baghdad has decided to re-establish
a large—scale CW production capability. However, "we assess that
Iraq has plans to re-establish such a capability." And "DL°1
judges that 64 DIA, Iraq: Chemical Warfare Program Handbook, December 14,
2001 (DI-1650-57-Ol).
page 31
- Saddam Husayn’s goal is to re-establish a robust chemical weapons (CW)
progra1n." Also in December, the CIA wrote a Senior Executive
Memorandum which stated that "_ - Iraq in the past several years has
rebuilt a covert chemical weapons production capability by reconstructing
dual-use industrial facilities and developing new chemical plans.66
- (U) A
January 2002 Defense Intelligence Assessment, Iraq ’s Weapons of Mass
Destruction and Theater Ballistic Missile Programs: Post-I I September,
stated "DIA cannot confirm with conidence that Iraq has successfully
restarted an offensive CW program. However, if it has, Iraq probably can
produce mustard, sarin or GF, and VX, though mustard may be the only agent
it can produce without external resources."66 The assessment also
commented on the possibility of using dual use facilities to produce
chemical weapons agent, noting that "DIA cannot state with confidence
the composition or total output of chemical products at (Iraq’s
suspected CW) facilities, but production lines are currently operational.
.. Currently, DIA cannot identify where the CW center of gravity exists,
but it could be hidden in dual-use and industrial facilities." _ The
question of Iraq’s production capabilities was also addressed in a May
16, 2002 CIA report, Iraq: Seeking To Expand CWProduction Capability. This
report assessed that "Iraq in the past three years has sought foreign
equipment and chemicals that would give it the capability to roduce
chemical warfare (CW) agents for a limited strategic stockpile, according
to reporting." The report went on to state that "Small-scale
chemical agent production, probably of mustard, sarin, GF, and VX, could
be hidden within Iraq’s legitimate chemical industry. Baghdad has the
equipment and the expertise to match its pre-Gulf war production of nerve
and blister agents, but Iraq’s inability to produce key precursors could
limit nerve agent production."67
- (U) On August l, 2002, the CIA
prepared another assessment which said, "Iraq probably has rebuilt a
covert CW production capability by expanding its chemical industry. It is
rebuilding former CW facilities, developing new chemical plants, and
trying to procure CW-related items covertly. We judge it has the
capability to produce mustard blister agent and the nerve agents sarin, GF,
and VX. Iraq’s CW agent production capability probably is more limited
than it was at the time of the Gulf war.68 (U) Thus while the intelligence
community believed that the Iraqi regime had retained some chemical
weapons and had worked to develop the capability to produce new chemical
weapons at unknown levels within its civilian chemical infrastructure. The
Intelligence Community had not reached conclusions on whether Iraq had
actually begun production of chemical weapons. President’s Speech to the
UN General Assembly (September 12, 2002) 65
- CIA, SPWR, The Iraqi Threat,
December 15, 2001 (SPWRl2l50l-07). 66 DIA, Iraq ’s Weapons of Mass
Destruction and Theater Ballistic Missile Programs.· Post-!] September,
January 2002 (DI- l 600-50Q-02-SCI). 67 CIA SEIB, Iraq: Seeking T 0 Expand
C WPr0ducti0n Capability, May I6, 2002 (PASS SEIB 02-l l4 CHX). 68 CIA,
Iraq: Expanding WMD Capabilities Post Growing Threat, August l, 2002. 32
page 32
- (U) In the President’s September 2002 speech to the United Nations
General Assembly, he stated that UN inspections "revealed that Iraq
likely maintains stockpiles of VX, mustard and other chemical
agents." This statement was consistent with the statements and
intelligence above.
- (U) The President’s statement that Iraq was
"rebuilding and expanding facilities capable of "` producing
chemical weapons" suggests more coincedence in Iraq’s progress than
the intelligence assessments at the time. Ir1 addition to the reports
described earlier, a July 22, 2002 CIA assessment noted that "Iraq
has rebuilt destroyed CW-related and civilian facilities while building a
number of new, ostensibly civilian chemical production facilities.
Although CIA does not know the function of these new facilities, chemical
precursors and, in some cases, agent production could be conducted at
dual-use chemical facilities.69 An April 2002 CIA paper noted that
"Iraq has obtained technical and logistical support to rehabilitate
its industrial chemical industry and potentially to rebuild its CW
program. Most ... assistance has involved the reconstruction of the
chlorine facility at Al Tareq. Al Tareq probably is still connected to
Iraq’s CW program and could be converted quickly to CW precursor
production."70
- (U) The September DIA report had written on this topic
that "Iraq retains all the chemicals and equipment to produce the
blister agent mustard but its ability for sustained production of G—series
nerve agents and VX is constrained by its stockpile of key chemical
precursors and by the destruction of all known CW production facilities
during Operation Desert Storm and during subsequent UNSCOM inspections. In
the absence of external aid, Iraq will likely experience difficulties in
producing nerve agents at the rate executed before Operation Desert
Storm" and that "Baghdad is rebuilding part of its chemical
production infrastructure under the guise of a civilian need for
pesticides, chlorine, and other legitimate chemical products, giving Iraq
the potential for a small ‘breakout’ production capability."71
President’s Speech in Cincinnati (October 7, 2002)
- (U) The President
discussed chemical weapons in greater detail at his Cincinnati speech of
October 2002. He stated that "we know" that Iraq "has
produced thousands of tons of chemical agents, including mustard gas,
sarin nerve gas, VX nerve gas" and that Iraq has used chemical
weapons before. The President stated that the Iraqi regime "possesses
and produces chernical" weapons. He cited "surveillance
photos" of rebuilding at facilities that had previously been used to
produce chemical weapons.
- (U) A September 2002 DIA report stated that
"There is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and
stockpiling chemical weapons, or where Iraq has —-or will--establish its
chemical warfare agent production facilities." The same report,
however, also said that "Iraq likely has resumed some chemical and
biological agent production, but we lack conclusive proof due to Iraq’s
effective national-level denial and deception (D&D) program."72
69 Iraq: Ensuring CBW Survivability, July 22, 2002, p.2. 70 Iraq: Chemical
Warfare Program Profiting From Equipment and Chemical Transfers, April
2002, p. l. 71 The DIA included similar language in a November 2002 report
described later in this report. 72 DIA, Iraq - Key WMD Facilities - An
Operational Support Study 2900-51 l-02, September 2002. 33
-
page 33
- (U) Intelligence community products clearly stated that Iraq had
produced large volumes of chemical agents in the past, during and after
its war with Iran. The intelligence community also agreed that Iraq had
used chemical weapons before, against Iran in the 1980s and against Iraqi
Kurds. As stated above, intelligence products prior to this speech but
before the October 2002 NIE assessed that Iraq possessed chemical weapons
- 100 metric tons of chemical agents or less in bulk storage and filled
munitions. Director Tenet’s testimony to Senate Committees in September
2002 stated that "We assess that Iraq retains a stockpile of at least
100 tons of agent" but did not state an upper end for the estimate.7
-
(U) Between the President’s September speech to the UN and the October
speech in Cincirmati, the intelligence community had produced and
disseminated its October 2002 NIE on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.
In most respects, the NIE’s judgments were more assertive than previous
intelligence judgments, stating that "We assess that Baghdad has
begun renewed production of mustard, sarin, GF (cyclosarin), and VX."
-
(U) On the question of chemical weapons stockpile, the NIE updated the
previous assessment- 100 tons or less — to an assessment that
"Saddam probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons (MT) and
possibly as much as 500 MT of CW agents—much of it added in the last
year." A footnote in the body of the report added that the 100 ton
figure was a "conservative estimate" and that the "500-ton
upper-end estimate takes into account practical bounds .... " In
saying that Iraq "has produced thousands of tons" of agent, the
President did not give the time frame for this production or say that Iraq
had this volume of agent stockpiled. The intelligence at the time did not
suggest that Iraq had produced — or was producing such quantities at the
time of the speech, though Iraq had produced such quantities since the
inception of its chemical weapons program. The NIE didn’t specifically
state how much chemical agent Iraq could produce. It did state that
"Iraq’s CW capability probably is more limited now than it was at
the time of the Gulf war, although VX production and agent shelf life
probably have been improved." - the intelligence community had
produced reports on construction and activity at suspected chemical
weapons facilities, in particular the Fallujah plants. These plants also
had legitimate dual-use purposes for producing chlorine, but the
intelligence community assessed that plants were producing more chemicals
than were needed for civilian purposes. The NIE noted that Iraq’s
legitimate needs were being met through authorized imports and other
chlorine plants in the country, and listed other reasons to be skeptical
that the plant was being used for legitimate purposes.74 President ’s
State of the Union Address (January 28, 2003) 73 Testimony of Director
George Tenet to the Senate Armed Services Committee, September 17, 2002.
74 October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate. The other reasons were: a
concern about the plant’s cover story, shallow burial of equipment for
denial and deception purposes, Iraq’s use of its procurement network to
obtain chemical weapons precursors, and that personnel identified with the
previous weapons program were linked to the facility.
page 34
- (U) In the President’s State of the Union Address in January 2003, he
said nothing has restrained Saddam Hussein from his pursuit of chemical
weapons (along with other WMD). He cited intelligence estimates that
Hussein "had the materials to produce as much as 500 tons of sarin,
mustard and VX nerve agent" and a former stockpile of "upwards
of 30,000 munitions capable of delivering chemical agents” that had not
been accounted for. A _
- (U) As described above, the October 2002 NIE
stated that Iraq had, as an upper limit, 500 tons on chemical agent and
that Iraq had renewed production of mustard, sarin, GF (cyclosarin), and
VX.
- (U) A November 2002 DIA report had stated that "Baghdad probably
has stocked at least 100 metric tons and possibly as much as 500 metric
tons of CW agents -- much of it added in the last year.” That same
report also contrasted with the NIE’s judgment that "Baghdad has
begtm renewed production” of certain CW agents, saying that "No
reliable information indicates whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling
chemical weapons, or where the country has — or will — establish its
chemical agent production facilities." The report also stated,
however, that "Iraq probably has resumed some chemical and biological
agent production, but no conclusive proof is available because of the
effective national-level denial and deception program.”75
- (U) The
Intelligence Community regularly reported that Iraq had not accounted for
its previous chemical weapons or precursor stockpiles and that Iraq
retained a large number of munitions capable of delivering chemical
weapons. The NIE stated that "Iraq provided little verifiable
evidence that it unilaterally destroyed 15,000 artillery rockets after the
Gulf war."
- (U) The reference to 30,000 (empty) chemical agent
munitions was based on UNSCOM reporting. The Intelligence Community had
provided assessments to policymakers in December 2002 and January 2003 on
Iraq’s WMD declarations. One assessment stated that "[The
declaration] fails to address unaccounted chemical munitions disputed by
the UN, including 550 155mm mustard filled artillery shells or 30,000
empty CW munitions."76 Another, provided by the CIA in advance of
Secretary Powell’s speech, stated that, "Baghdad did not account
for 30,000 empty prewar munitions, which leaves us concerned that Iraq
retained a supply for later filling with CW agents."77 Secretary of
State ’s Address t0 the UN Security Council (February 5, 2003) (U)
Secretary Powell’s February 2003 speech repeated many of the statements
addressed above. He stated that ‘%zve know Iraq has embedded key
portions" of a chemical weapons program into its civilian industry
and reconstituted facilities associated with its past weapons program.
Secretary Powell addressed the intelligence on Iraq’s stockpile as had
been done in speeches described above, saying that "[o]ur
conservative estimate is that Iraq today has a stockpile of between 100
and 500 tons of chemical weapons agent." 75 DLA, Iraq’s Nuclear,
Biological, and Chemical Weapon and Missile Programs: Progress, Prospects,
and Potential Vulnerabilities DI-1569-44-02, November 2002. 76 US Analysis
of Iraq’s Declaration, 7 December 2002. 77 CIA input for Powell speech,
provided to the White House in mid-January 2003.
page 35
- (U) Also described in this statement but not the others previously
addressed, Secretary Powell referenced human sources who said that Saddam
Hussein had authorized field commanders to use chemical weapons. He also
referred to sources claims that Saddam Hussein’s regime had experimented
on human beings as part of its chemical weapons program.
- (U) As described
above, the October 2002 NIE assessed that 100 tons of chemical weapons
agent was a "conservative estimate" and that Iraq could possess
"possibly as much as 500 MT." A footnote to the NIE elaborated
that the Intelligence Community believed that "the Iraqis are capable
of producing significantly larger quantities of CQ agent in some
scenarios; the 500-ton upper-end estimate takes into account practical
bounds, such as Iraq’s limited delivery options, and approximates Iraq’s
stocks at the time of Operation Desert Storm."78 According to the Committee’s
first report, analysts believed that the 500 ton figure was meant as an
upper bound, and not as an estimate of Iraq’s stockpile.79
- (U) In two
places, the October 2002 NIE states that Saddam Hussein had delegated the
authority to use chemical weapons to "corps-level commanders" at
the end of the Iran-Iraq war or shortly aferwards.
- (U) On the topic of
human testing, the October 2002 NIE stated that "A former Directorate
of General Security officer said that 1,600 death row prisoners in 1995
were transferred "to the Haditha area" for CBW testing—probably
to the Qadisiyah complex—from Baghdad prisons. Inmate transfer files
from 1995 were missing during UNSCOM inspections of the Baghdad prisons in
1998, adding weight to the source’s claim.”80 Other Statements •
There’s no doubt that he has chemical weapon stocks. We destroyed some
after the Gulf War with the inspection regime, but there’s no doubt in
our mind that he still has chemical weapon stocks and he has the capacity
to produce more chemical weapons. — Secretary of State Colin Powell, Fox
News Sunday, September 8, 2002. • "So, we know that he has stored
the biological weapons. We know that he has used chemical weapons. And we
know that he has looked for ways to weaponize those and deliver them. —
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Late Edition, September 8,
2002 7* me at 28. 79 SSCI report at 206. 80 Additional reporting on human
experimentation was in a CIA SPWR (Senior Publish When Ready), Possible
Experimentation on Prisoners, December 30, 2002, which reported that
"Baghdad is experimenting on prisoners with toxic substances"
and that Iraq had used prisoners for biological and chemical agent testing
in the 1980s and 1990s.
page 36
- • “His regime has amassed large clandestine stockpiles of chemical
weapons, including VX and sarin and mustard gas." — Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed Services
Committee, September 18, 2002. • “He’s got chemical weapons; he
needs to get rid of them, all of them." — President George W Bush,
Remarks in Houston, Texas, September 26, 2002. • "They have amassed
large clandestine stocks of biological weapons including anthrax and
possibly smallpox. They have amassed large clandestine stockpiles of
chemical weapons including VX and sarin and mustard gas. His regime has an
active program to acquire and develop nuclear weapons." — Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Atlanta Chamber of Commerce, September 27,
2002 • "His regime has large, unaccounted for stockpiles of
chemical and biological weapons - including VX, sarin, mustard gas,
anthrax, botulism, and possibly smallpox - and he has an active program to
acquire and develop nuclear weapons." — Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld, Remarks to ROA, January 20, 2003 • "The December 7, 2002
declaration was padded with reams of extraneous material, but failed to
address scores of questions pending since 1998. It seeks to deceive when
it says that Iraq has no ongoing VVMD programs. Illustrative examples —
but not a complete list — of Iraq’s omissions identified as issues by
UNSCOM include: 550 artillery munitions filled with mustard agent; tons of
unaccounted for chemical weapons precursors; 30,000 empty chemical
munitions; tens of thousands of liters of unaccounted biological
agents." — President George W Bush, Report on Matters Relevant to
the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of
2002, January 20, 2003 • "What happened to nearly 30,000 munitions
capable of carrying chemical agents? Saddam should tell the truth, and
tell the truth now. The more we wait, the more chance there is for this
dictator with clear ties to terrorist groups, including Al-Qaida, more
time for him to pass a weapon, share a technology, or use these weapons
again." — Secretary of State Colin Powell, remarks at the World
Economic Forum, January 26, 2003 (U) These statements were consistent with
the intelligence described above.
-
- Conclusions
- (U) Conclusion 3: Statements
in the major speeches analyzed, as well additional statements, regarding
Iraq’s possession of chemical weapons were substantiated by intelligence
information. Intelligence assessments, including the December 2000 ICA
stated that Iraq had retained up to 100 metric tons of its chemical
weapons stockpile. The October 2002 NIE provided a range of 100 to 500
metric tons of chemical weapons.
page 37
-
- (U`) Conclusion 4: Statements by the President and Vice President prior
to the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate regarding Iraq’s
chemical weapons production capability and activities did not reflect the
intelligence community’s uncertainties as to whether such production was
ongoing. The intelligence community assessed that Saddam Hussein wanted to
have chemical weapons production capability and that Iraq was seeking to
hide such capability in its dual use chemical industry. Intelligence
assessments, especially prior to the October 2002 NIE, clearly stated that
analysts could not confirm that production was ongoing.
- Postwar Findings
-
(U`) The Committee reported on postwar findings on Iraq’s chemical
weapons program in its September 2006 report, Postwar Findings about Iraq
’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare with Prewar
Assessments. The Committee found the following.
- (U`) Following the war,
the Iraq Survey Group conducted its review of Iraq’s weapons of mass
destruction programs and found that there "were no caches of CW
munitions and no single rounds of CW munitions." Additionally,
"the ISG has high confidence that there are no CW present in the
Iraqi inventory."8l Some pre-1991 chemical weapons munitions have
been found since the end of the combat operations.
- (U`) The ISG found no
credible evidence indicating Iraq resumed its chemical weapons program
after 1991, but said that "Saddam never abandoned his intentions to
resume a CW effort when sanctions were lifted and conditions were judged
favorable."82
- (U`) The ISG investigated whether Iraq had intended to
produce chemical weapons through its civilian chemical industry. It found
that Iraq had an inherent capability to use its civilian industry for
sulfur mustard CW agents, but did not find any production units that had
been configured to produce CW agents or key chemical precursors. The ISG
found that Iraq did not have a capability to produce nerve agents.83 gl
Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD,
Chemical Section at p. 123. 82 Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor
to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, Chemical Section at p. land 97. 83
Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD,
Chemical Section at p. 25. _ 38
page 38
-
- V. Weapons of Mass Destruction • "Simply stated, there is no
doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no
doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies,
and against us." - Vice President Richard Cheney, Nashville,
Tennessee, August 26, 2002 • "As former Secretary of State
Kissinger recently stated: ‘The imminence of proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, the huge dangers it involves, the rejection of a viable
inspection system, and the demonstrated hostility of Saddam Hussein
combine to produce an imperative for preemptive action."’ - Vice
President Richard Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee, August 26, 2002 •
"And our greatest fear is that terrorists will find a shortcut to
their mad ambitions when an outlaw regime supplies them with the
technologies to kill on a massive scale. In one place — in one regime
— we find all these dangers, in their most lethal and aggressive forms,
exactly the kind of aggressive threat the United Nations was born to
confront." - President George W Bush, Address to the United Nations
General Assembly, September 12, 2002 • "Saddam Hussein’s regime
is a grave and gathering danger. To suggest otherwise is to hope against
the evidence." - President George W Bush, Address to the United
Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002 • "But Saddam Hussein
has defied all these efforts and continues to develop weapons of mass
destruction. The first time we may be completely certain he has a -
nuclear weapons is when, God forbids, he uses one." - President
George W Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September
12, 2002 • "If we know that Saddam Hussein has dangerous weapons
today — and we do- does it make any sense for the world to wait to
confront him as he grows stronger and develops even more dangerous
weapons?" - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7,
2002 • "Saddam is harboring terrorists and the instruments of
terror, the instruments of death and destruction." - President George
W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "From intelligence
sources we know, for instance, that thousands of Iraqi security personnel
are at work hiding documents and materials fiom the UN inspectors,
sanitizing inspection sites and monitoring the inspectors
themselves." - President George W Bush, State of the Union Address,
January 29, 2002 • "Indeed, the facts and Iraq’s behavior show
that Saddam Hussein and his regime are concealing their efforts to produce
more weapons of mass destruction." - Secretary of State Colin Powell,
Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003
page 39
- "Numerous human sources tell us that the Iraqis are moving not
just documents and hard drives, but weapons of mass destruction, to keep
them from being found by inspectors." - Secretary of State Colin
Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003
• "VVe also have satellite photos that indicate that banned
materials have recently been moved from a number of Iraqi weapons of mass
destruction facilities." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address
t0 the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003
- (U) In major
policy speeches the President, the Vice President and the Secretary of
State all stated that the Iraqi government possessed weapons of mass
destruction. In later speeches, both the President and the Secretary of
State said that the Iraqi government was engaged in a large- scale
deception effort to conceal weapons of mass destruction programs from
United Nations inspectors.
- (U) Scope Note: The term ‘weapons of mass
destruction’ (or ‘WMD’) is commonly used to refer collectively to
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and this is the official
Department of Defense definition.84 No official definition existed for the
intelligence community at the time of the speeches being examined, and
different intelligence products have used different definitions. A
substantial number of policymaker statements regarding Iraq referred
generally to ‘weapons of mass destruction"‘, without specifying
whether the weapons in question were nuclear, biological, chemical, or
some combination thereof. This section examines statements that refer
generally to ‘weapons of mass destruction’, and compares them to
intelligence regarding these three types of weapons. Statements regarding
specific types of weapons are discussed in the other, corresponding
sections of this report. Vice President’s Speech in Tennessee (August
26, 2002)
- (U) In the Vice President’s August 2002 speech on Iraq, he
stated that "there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of
mass destruction," and that "there is no doubt he is amassing
them". He also quoted a former Secretary of State referencing
"the imminence of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction"
with regard to Iraq, and "the huge dangers it involves", as
evidence that preemptive action was necessary.85
- (U) As noted, the term
‘weapons of mass destruction’ is commonly used to refer collectively
to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The intelligence community
never assessed that Iraq 84 Discussions of WMD frequently include
references to ballistic missiles and other WMD delivery systems, but
delivery systems by themselves are specifically excluded from the official
Department of Defense definition. The Department of Defense Dictionary of
Military and Associated Terms dennes "weapons of mass
destruction" as "Weapons that are capable of a high order of
destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large
numbers of people. Weapons of mass destruction can be high-yield
explosives or nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological weapons, but
exclude the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such
means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon." 85 White
House Transcript, Vice President Speaks at VFW 103rd National Convention,
August 26, 2002. 40
possessed nuclear weapons, but reached different conclusions about
chemical and biological weapons.86 (U) In the late 1990s and early 2000s
the intelligence community had consistently assessed that Iraq possessed
remnants from its previous biological weapons stockpile. Some reporting
also assessed that Iraq had an active biological weapons program, and that
production of biological weapons was ongoing.87 (U) During this same time
frame, intelligence assessments noted that Iraq maintained a small
stockpile of pre-Gulf War chemical weapons. Some assessments stated that
Iraq had developed the capability to produce new chemical weapons at
unknown levels within its civilian chemical infrastructure, while other
assessments were not conclusive on this point. The Intelligence Community
had not reached conclusions about whether Iraq had actually begun
production of chemical weapons.88 (U) The intelligence community’s
assessments regarding Iraqi possession and production of chemical and
biological weapons remained consistent until the October 2002 National
Intelligence Estimate. President’s Speech to the UN General Assembly
(September 12, 2002) (U) In the President’s September 2002 address to
the United Nations General Assembly, he stated that Saddam Hussein’s
regime was a "grave and gathering danger", and "continues
to develop weapons of mass destruction." He did not state that Iraq
possessed or produced weapons of mass destruction at that time.89 (U)
Several intelligence assessments discussed Iraq’s development of
"weapons of mass destruction" generally. While not from a
iinished intelligence product, a briefing book prepared by the CIA in May
2002 for the Prirrcipals’ Committee of the National Security Council
said that "Iraq’s activities since 1998 clearly show that it has
repaired and expanded dual-use WMD facilities, increased WMD production
capabilities, and advanced clandestine production and procurement? As of
September 2002, intelligence community assessments stated that Iraq had
worked to rebuild a chemical weapons production capacity within its
civilian industry but did not state that production was ongoing. The
intelligence community also assessed that Iraq maintained the capability
to produce biological weapons, and the CIA assessed that production was
ongoing.9° 86 A summary of the intelligence community’s assessments
regarding nuclear weapons and Iraq can be found in the Nuclear Weapons
section of this report. 87 A summary of the intelligence community’s
assessments regarding biological weapons and Iraq can be found in the
Biological Weapons section of this report. 88 A summary of the
intelligence community’s assessments regarding chemical weapons and Iraq
can be found in the Chemical Weapons section of this report. 89 White
House Transcript, President ’s Remarks at the United Nations General
Assembly. 90 National Intelligence Estimate, Foreign Missile Developments
and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015, December 2001; CIA Iraq
Seeking To Expand C WProduction Capacity, May 16, 2002; DIA Iraq:
Biological Warfare Program Handbook. _ 41
(U) The intelligence community did not publish a coordinated community
judgment that Iraq had begtm to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program
until October 2002. I However, as discussed in the Nuclear Weapons section
of this report, by September 2002 both the CIA and the DIA concluded that
reconstitution had begun.92 President’s Speech in Cincinnati (October Z
2002) (U) In the President’s speech on Iraq in Cincinnati, he stated
that "we lcnow that Saddam Hussein has dangerous weapons today"
and that "Saddam is harboring terrorists and the instruments of
terror, the instruments of death and destruction." He also implied
that Saddam was likely to develop "even more dangerous
weapons."93 (U) The October 2002 NIE assessed with high levels of
confidence that Iraq possessed both chemical and biological weapons and
was continuing with active production programs. This represented a shift
from previous intelligence community assessments, which concluded that
Iraq probably possessed a small stockpile of chemical weapons and
biological weapons. Previous community assessments did not judge that Iraq
was actively producing chemical weapons, and had lower confidence that
biological weapons production was ongoing. Intelligence agencies did not
agree on the question of whether Baghdad was attempting to reconstitute
its nuclear program, but the majority view of the NIE (which all agencies
except State/INR supported) concluded that reconstitution had begun, and
that Iraq would probably be able to produce a nuclear weapon in the next
five to seven years.94 President’s State of the Union Address (January
29, 2003) (U) In the President’s 2003 State of the Union Address, he
stated that "thousands of Iraqi security personnel are at work hiding
documents and materials from the UN inspectors, sanitizing inspection
sites, and monitoring the inspectors themselves."95 (U) As of January
2003, the intelligence community had not produced a coordinated assessment
regarding the Iraqi government’s response to the ongoir1g UNMOVIC
inspections. However, both the CIA and the DIA had produced multiple
reports suggesting that active deception efforts were underway, and that
these efforts ir1cluded sanitizing weapons facilities as well as
concealing 91 The 2002 NIE represented the first collective intelligence
community assessment on this topic since the December 2001 NIE, Foreign
Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015. The
December 2001 NIE was consistent with previous assessments that Iraq did
not appear to have reconstituted its nuclear weapons program. 92 National
Intelligence Estimate, Iraq 's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass
Destruction, October 2002; Defense Intelligence Assessment Iraq 's
Reemerging Nuclear Weapons Program, September 2002; CIA Iraq: Expanding
WILID Capabilities Pose Growing Threat, August 2002. 93 White House
Transcript, President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat, October 7, 2002. 94
Intelligence Community Assessment, Iraq.· Steadily Pursuing WMD
Capabilities, December 2000; National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s
Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002. 95
White House Transcript, President Delivers "State of the Union
", January 28, 2003. 42
documents and other evidence. The reports generally did not describe
the number of Iraqis involved in these apparent efforts with any
speciiicity.96 Secretary of State ’s Address to the UN Security Council
(February 5, 2003) (U) In the Secretary of State’s February 5, 2003
address to the United Nations Security Council, he said that the Iraqi
regime was actively concealing "efforts to produce more weapons of
mass destruction." He stated that numerous hrunan sources had
reported that Iraqis were concealing "not just documents and hard
drives, but weapons of mass destruction" from UN inspectors. He said
that satellite photos "indicate that banned materials have recently
been moved from a number of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction
facilities."9' (U) A coordinated Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA)
from February 2003, entitled Iraq 's Denial and Deception Capabilities
judged that Iraq successfully employed a number of denial and deception
techniques against UN inspectors and US intelligence agencies. The ICA
stated that these techniques included moving prohibited materials and
evidence among multiple "hide sites", and that this conclusion
was based on reporting from human sources and "defector
testimony". The ICA also included recent satellite imagery of a
storage facility that "showed the removal of possible chemical
munitions from this site, almost certainly to thwart the UNMOVIC
inspections conducted there."98 Additional Statements • "Every
world leader that comes to see me, I explain our concerns about a nation
which is not conforming to agreements that it made in the past; a nation
which has gassed her people in the past; a nation which has weapons of
mass destruction and apparently is not afraid to use them." —President
George W Bush, Press Conkrence, March I3, 2002 • "And [Saddam
Hussein] is a man who refuses to allow us to determine whether or not he
still has weapons of mass destruction, which leads me to believe he does.
He is a dangerous man who possesses the world’s most dangerous
weapons". — President George W Bush, Press Conference, March 22,
2002 • "Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now
has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt that he is amassing
them to use them against our friends, against our allies and against us.
And there is no doubt that his aggressive regional ambitions will lead him
into future confrontations with his neighbors; confrontations that
96Iraq.· Bolstering Ejjbrts to Deceive Inspectors, November 30, 2002;
CIA, Iraq: Moving C WInto Underground Facilities, December 17, 2002; DIA
Executive Highlight, Iraq: Reports of Iraq concealing experts on weapons
of mass destruction increased notably during the past week January 6,
2003; CIA, Iraq: Undermining WMD Inspections, January 6, 2003; DIA
Executive Highlight, Iraq: The Iraqi Intelligence Service has taken on an
increased role in concealment of Iraq 's weapons of mass destruction
experts, January 9, 2003. 97 White House Transcript, US. Secretary of
State Colin Powell Addresses the UN Security Council, February 5, 2003. 98
Intelligence Community Assessment, Iraq 's Denial and Deception
Capabilities, February 2003. _ 43
will involve both the weapons that he has today and the ones he will
continue to develop with his oil wealth. ... In the face of such a threat,
we must proceed with care, deliberation and in consultation with our
allies. ...W`hat we must not do in the face of a mortal threat is to give
in to wishful thinking or to willful blindness.’ — Vice President Dick
Cheney, Statement before the Veterans of the Korean War, San Antonio,
Texas, August, 29, 2002 • "l’m deeply concerned about a leader
who has ignored all -- who ignored the United Nations for all these years,
has refused to conform to resolution after resolution after resolution;
who has weapons of mass destruction. And the battlefield has now shifted
to America, so there’s a different dynamic than we’ve ever faced
before." - President George W Bush, Remarks at the Afghanistan
Embassy, September 10, 2002 • "l would respond this way. lf failure
to comply with weapons of mass destruction inspections is a casus belli,
the UN already has it." - Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,
Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002
• "...[I]t’s clear from the Iraqi regime’s eleven years of
defiance that containment has not led to their compliance. To the
contrary, contair1ment is breaking dowr1." — Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September
18, 2002 r • "And [Saddam Hussein] has biological and chemical
weapons. And he is aggressively pursuing nuclear weapons. The region knows
that." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the
House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002 • "[Saddam
Hussein] has in place an elaborate organized system of denial and
deception to frustrate both inspectors and outside intelligence efforts.
...We do know that the Iraqi regime has chemical and biological weapons of
mass destruction, that they’re pursuing nuclear weapons, that they’ve
a proven willingness to use those weaporrs... ...We do know that Saddam
Hussein has been actively and persistently pursuing nuclear weapons for
more than 20 years, but we should be just as concerned about the immediate
threat from biological weapons. Iraq has these weapons." - Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, September 19, 2002 • "[T]his is a man who has weapons of
mass destruction and says he doesn’t. He poses a serious threat to the
American people." — President George W Bush, Remarks at OHS
Complex, September 19, 2002 • "We can have debates about the size
and nature of the Iraqi stockpile of WMD and of mid- and long-range
missiles. But no one can doubt the record of Iraqi violations of United
Nations Security Council resolutions, one after another, and for twelve
long years." — Secretary of State Colin Powell, Testimony before
the House International Relations Committee, September 19, 2002 _ 44
• "These four years have been more tha.n enough time for Iraq to
procure, develop, and hide proscribed items well beyond the reach of the
kinds of inspectors that were subject to Sadda.m’s cheat and retreat
program from 1991 to 1998." — Secretary of State Colin Powell,
Testimony before the House International Relations Committee, September
19, 2002 • ". . .[N]o one ca.n doubt that the Iraqi dictator’s
intentions have not changed. He wants weapons of mass destruction as
clearly as he wants to remain in power." — Secretary of State Colin
Powell, Testimony before the House International Relations Committee,
September 19, 2002 • "The point is this: we know Iraq possesses
biological weapons, and chemical weapons, and is expanding and improving
their capabilities to produce them. That should be of every bit as much
concern as Iraq’s potential nuclear capability." — Secretary of
Defense Rumsfeld, Testimony before SASC, September 19, 2002 • "For
eleven years he’s claimed he has had no weapons and, yet, we know he
has." — President George W Bush, Remarks in Trenton, New Jersey,
September 23, 2002 • "We know they [the Iraqi regime] have weapons
of mass destruction. We know they have active programs. There isn’t any
debate about it." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,
Department of Defense Press Conference, September 26, 2002 •
"[Saddam Hussein’s] got chemical weapons; he needs to get rid of
them, all of them. He’s got biological weapons; he needs to destroy all
of them. There’s no doubt in my mind he wants to have a nuclear weapon,
and he’s got some capacity. I’m not saying he’s got one yet, but he’s
developing the capacity, as we learned right after Desert Storm...The
burden of proof is on Saddam Hussein." — President George W Bush,
Remarks in Houston, Texas, September 26, 2002 • "We ca.n have
debates about the size and nature of the Iraqi stockpile, we can have
debates about how long it will take him to reach this level of readiness
or that level of readiness with respect to these weapons, but no one can
doubt two things: One, they are in violation of these resolutions. There’s
no debate about that. And secondly, they have not lost the intent to
develop these weapons of mass destruction, whether they are one day, five
days, one year, or seven years away from any particular weapon, whether
their stockpile is small, medium or large, what has not been lost is the
intent to have such weapons of mass destruction." - Secretary of
State Colin Powell, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, September 26, 2002 • "The danger to our country is
grave. The danger to our country is growing. The Iraqi regime possesses
biological and chemical weapons." — President George W Bush,
Statement in the Rose Garden, September 26, 2002 • "The man who
said he would get rid of weapons of mass destruction still has them. And
we need to fear the fact that he has weapons of mass destruction. He’s
used them before. _ 45
He’s used them on his own people before. He’s invaded two
countries. He’s lied and deceived the world." — President George
W Bush, Remarks in Denver, Colorado, September 27, 2002 • "We know
[Saddam’s] got chemical weapons, probably has biological weapons."
— President George W Bush, Remarks in Portsmouth, New Hampshire,
November 1, 2002 • "Well, we know that Saddam Hussein has chemical
and biological weapons. And we know he has an active program for the
development of nuclear weapons." — Secretary of Dejense Donald
Rumsfeld, CBS Radio, November 14, 2002 • "In short, we have not
seen anything that indicates that the Iraqi regime has made a strategic
decision to disarm. On the contrary, we believe that Iraq is actively
working to disrupt, deny and defeat inspectors." — President George
W Bush, Report on Matters Relevant to the Authorization for Use of
Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, January 20, 2003 •
"So far, however, there are no signs that the regime has taken the
decision to make a strategic shift in its approach and to give up its WMD.
Indeed, there are many troubling and serious signs that it has no
intention to disarm at all." — President Bush, Report on Matters
Relevant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq
Resolution of 2003, January 20, 2003 • "Even more serious is Iraq’s
response to UNSCR 1441 ’s requirement that Iraq make a "currently
accurate, full and complete" declaration of its weapons of mass
destruction activities. Iraq’s declaration was incomplete and
inaccurate." — President George W Bush, Report on Matters Relevant
to the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of
2002, January 20, 2003 • "[Saddam Hussein] has been told to disarm
for eleven long years. He’s not disarming." — President George W
Bush, remarks with economists, January 2], 2003 • "[Saddam Hussein]
has weapons of mass destruction, the world’s deadliest weapons, which
pose a direct threat to the United States, our citizens and our friends
and a1lies." — President George W Bush, Remarks with Economists,
January 2], 2003 • "The Iraqi regime has actively and secretly
attempted to obtain equipment needed to produce chemical, biological and
nuclear weapons." —— President George Bush, Press Conference,
February 6, 2003 • "In this case, we’re dealing with a country, a
regime that has chemical weapons, biological weapons and a nuclear
program, and has used chemical weapons against its neighbors and its own
people." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Press Conference,
February 7, 2003 _ 46
• "So has the strategic decision been made to disarm Iraq of its
weapons of mass destruction by the leadership of Baghdad? I think our
judgment has to be clearly not." — Secretary of State Colin Powell,
United Nations Security Council, March 7, 2003 • "But we also have
to address the question of where might these terrorists acquire weapons of
mass destruction, chemical weapons, biological weapons, nuclear weapons?
And Saddam Hussein becomes a prime suspect in that regard because of his
past track record and because we know he has, in fact, developed these
kinds of capabilities, chemical and biological weapons. We know he’s
used chemical weapons. We know he’s reconstituted these programs since
the Gulf War. We know he’s out trying once again to produce nuclear
weapons and we know that he has a long-standing relationship with various
terrorist groups, including the al-Qaeda organization." — Vice
President Dick Cheney, Meet the Press, March 16, 2003 • "lntelligence
gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq
regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons
ever devised." — President George W Bush, Address to the Nation,
March 17, 2003 • "The Iraqi regime has violated all of those
obligations. It possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons. It
is seeking nuclear weapons." — President Bush, Report in Connection
w/ Presidential Determination under PL 107-244, March 19, 2003 (U) The
above statements are all consistent with the five policy speeches
analyzed. The statements below differ in significant ways, either by
making different assertions or addressing diHerent topics. • "They
now have massive tunneling systems. . .They’ve got all kinds of things
that have happened in the period when the inspectors have been out. So the
problem is greater today. And the regime that exists today in the U.N. is
one that has far fewer teeth than the one you are desc1ibing." -
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed
Services Committee, September 18, 2002 • "Even the most intrusive
inspection regime would have difficulty getting at all of [Saddam Hussein’s]
weapons of mass destruction. Many of his WMD capabilities are mobile; they
can be hidden from inspectors no matter how intrusive. He has vast
underground networks and facilities and sophisticated denial and deception
techniques." - Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld Testimony before
the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002 • "[W]e
simply do not know where all or even a large portion of Iraq’s WMD
facilities are. We do know where a fraction of them are. . .[O]f the
facilities we do know, not all are vulnerable to attack from the air. A
good many are underground and deeply buried. Others are purposely located
near population centers —— schools, hospitals, mosques — where an
airstrike could kill a large number of innocent people. The Iraq problem
cannot be solved by air strikes alone." — Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before Senate Armed Services Committee,
September 19, 2002 47
• "Iraqi operatives continue to hide biological and chemical
agents to avoid detection by inspectors. In some cases, these materials
have been moved to different locations every l2 to 24 hours, or placed in
vehicles that are in residential neighborhoods." — President George
W Bush, National Press Conference, March 6, 2003 • "He claims to
have no chemical or biological weapons, yet we know he continues to hide
biological and chemical weapons, moving them to different locations as
often as l2 to 24 hours, and placing them in residential
neighborhoods." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Press
Conference, March I 1, 2003 (U) In testimony before Congress on September
18 and l9, 2002, the Secretary of Defense stated that the Iraqi regime had
developed extensive underground facilities and elaborate deception
techniques to conceal WMD prograrns.99 (U) Throughout the late 1990s and
early 2000s, intelligence agencies consistently assessed that the Iraqi
regime engaged in aggressive denial and deception tactics, particularly
with regard to weapons programs}0 - The Iraqi regime was known to have
constructed underground facilities for a variety of purposes, but the
intelligence community was not aware of any large, deeply-buried
facilities. US intelligence analysts suspected that the regime might be
using underground facilities to conceal weapons activities, and there was
some unconfirmed reporting that suggested this, but no intelligence agency
claimed to know the location of any active underground WMD facilities, and
none expressed certainty that such facilities existed. The Defense
Intelligence Agency assessed in 2001 that "elements of the regime’s
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile programs robably
are located in underground facilities", but noted that "neither
_ ¤<>r i¤t˘11ig˘¤<>˘ S<>¤r<>˘S have
conhrmed any WMD- or ballistic missile related underground
facilities." An August 2002 DIA report noted that "Iraq has
reportedly rebuilt its full offensive BW program in well- concealed,
underground, mobile or difficult-to-locate facilities" but went on to
state that "no biological weapons (BW)-related underground facilities
are currently confirmed to be in use in Iraq".1°1 (U) In November
2002, the National Intelligence Council prepared an assessment on
underground facilities in response to a request from the Secretary of
Defense. This report stated that Iraq had an extensive network of
underground facilities "consisting primarily of earth- bunkered
aboveground structures, basement bunkers, and shallow-buried
facilities." It went on 99 Department of Defense Transcript,
Testimony as Delivered before the House Armed Services Committee regarding
Iraq, September 18, 2002; Department of Defense Transcript, Testimony as
Delivered by Secretary of Defense Donald Rums eld be ore the Senate Armed
Services Committee re ardin Ira , Se tember 19, 2002. M mA. [mq.- 1r¤qiDe¤i¤1
and Deception: Countertargeting Methods, February 28, 1998; CIA, Iraq:
Status of the Nuclear Program, January 11, 2002; DIA, Iraq: Nuclear
Program Handbook, May 2002. wl DIA, Iraq: Chemical Warfare Program
Handbook, December 14, 2001; DLA, Iraq: Biological Warfare Program
Handbook August 2002. Both of these assessments noted that Iraq had stored
some biological and chemical munitions underground during the Gulf War. _
48
to say that "We assess that Iraq has some large, deeply buried
UGFs, but, because of the Iraqi denial and deception (D&D) program, we
have not been able to locate any of these. . .A1l the military and
regime-associated UGFs [underground facilities] we have identified thus
far are vulnerable to conventional, precision- guided, penetrating
munitions because they are not deeply cd>»·lO2 • "Iraq must be
disarmed of all nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, weapons
production capabilities, and the means to deliver these weapons. This will
be a complex, dangerous, and expensive task -- one for which detailed
planning is underway. Third, we must also eliminate Iraq’s terrorist
infrastructure." — Mr. Stephan Hadley, Remarks before the Council
on Foreign Relations, February I2, 2003 (U) In a speech in February 2003,
the Deputy National Security Advisor stated that Iraq needed to be
disarmed of all nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, production
capabilities and delivery systems. The October 2002 NIE assessed that Iraq
possessed chemical and biological weapons, but the intelligence community
did not assess that Iraq had nuclear weapons.1°3 _ The assertion in the
final two statements about movement of materials matched a February 2003
CIA assessment, reporting a "mid-ranking Iraqi security officer
involved in the surveillance of United Nations Monitoring, Verification,
and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) activities in Iraq" who said
Iraqi authorities had "decided that prohibited materials would never
remain in any one location for more than 12 hours or 24 hours at the most
and only under specihc circumstances."1°4 A second report sourced to
an "Iraqi Security Officia1" said that Iraq’s WIWD "had
begun being moved to new locations every 12 hours."1°6 Conclusions
(U) Conclusion 5: Statements by the President, Vice President, Secretary
of State and Secretary of Defense regarding Iraq’s possession of weapons
of mass destruction were generally substantiated by intelligence
information, though many statements made 102 National Intelligence
Council, Implications of Iraqi Underground Facilities for US National
Security, November 2002. '°3 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s
Continuing Programs or Wea ons 0 Mass Destruction, October 2002. IM CIA
assessment, DO Memorandum Intelli ence Report, Feb 12, 2003. CIA DO
Memorandum Intelli ence Report, Q Fcbm 12, 2002. CIA D0 M0m0r0¤<1¤m
I¤˘011is0¤¤0 R0p0¤. Mm 3. 2003. _ 49
_ regarding ongoing production prior to late 2002 reflected a higher
level of certainty than the intelligence judgments themselves. Many senior
policymaker statements in early and mid-2002 claimed that there was no
doubt that the Iraqi government possessed or was producing weapons of mass
destruction. While the intelligence community assessed at this time that
the Iraqi regime possessed some chemical and biological munitions, most
reports produced prior to fall 2002 cited intelligence gaps regarding
production and expressed room for doubt about whether production was
ongoing. Prior to late 2002, the intelligence community did not
collectively assess with any certainty that Iraq was actively producing
any weapons of mass destruction. (U) Conclusion 6: The Secretary of
Defense’s statement that the Iraqi government operated underground WMD
facilities that were not vulnerable to conventional airstrikes because
they were underground and deeply buried was not substantiated by available
intelligence information. While many intelligence analysts suspected that
the Iraqi government might be using underground facilities to conceal WMD
activities, no active underground WMD facilities had been positively
identified. Furthermore, none of the underground government facilities
that had been identified were buried deeply enough to be safe from
conventional airstrikes. Postwar Findings (U) Postwar findings regarding
weapons of mass destruction can be found in the nuclear, biological, and
chemical sections of this report. 50
VI. Delivery • "Iraq also possesses a force of Scud-type
missiles with ranges beyond the 150 kilometers permitted by the U.N. Work
at testing and production facilities shows that Iraq is building more
long-range missiles that it can [sic] inflict mass death throughout the
region." - President George W Bush, Address to the United Nations
General Assembly, September 12, 2002 • "Iraq possesses ballistic
missiles with a likely range of hundreds of miles. . .We’ve also
discovered through intelligence that Iraq has a growing fleet of manned
and unmanned aerial vehicles that could be used to disperse chemical or
biological weapons across broad areas. We’re concerned that Iraq is
exploring ways of using these UAVs for missions targeting the United
States." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002
• "For example, Iraq had a program to modify aerial fuel tanks for
Mirage jets." - ` Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the
United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "1n 1995, an
Iraqi military officer, Mujahid Saleh Abdul Latif, told inspectors that
Iraq intended the spray tanks to be mounted onto a MiG-21 that had been
converted into an unmanned aerial vehicle, or UAV. UAVs outfitted with
spray tanks constitute an ideal method for launching a terrorist attack
using biological weapons." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address
to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "While
inspectors destroyed most of the prohibited ballistic missiles, numerous
intelligence reports over the past decade from sources inside Iraq
indicate that Saddam Hussein retains a covert force of up to a few dozen
Scud-variant ballistic missiles. These are missiles with a range of 650 to
900 kilometers." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the
United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "W`hat 1 want
you to know today is that Iraq has programs that are intended to produce
ballistic missiles that fly 1,000 kilometers. One program is pursuing a
liquid fuel missile that would be able to fly more than 1,200
kilometers." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United
Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "Iraq has been working
on a variety of UAVs for over a decade." - Secretary of State Colin
Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003
• "There is ample evidence that Iraq has dedicated much effort to
developing and testing spray devices that could be adapted for UAVs."
- Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security
Council, February 5, 2003 • "According to Iraq’s December 7m
declaration, its UAVs have a range of only 80 kilometers. But we detected
one of Iraq’s newest UAVs in a test flight that went 500 _ 51
kilometers nonstop on autopilot in the racetrack pattern depicted
here." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United
Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "Iraq could use these
small UAVs which have a wingspan of only a few meters to deliver
biological agents to its neighbors, or if transported, to other countries,
including the United States." - Secretary of State Colin Powell,
Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 (U) In
major policy speeches the President and the Secretary of State described
Iraq as possessing and developing advanced weapon systems, particularly
unmanned aerial vehicles and longer-range ballistic missiles. Both the
President and the Secretary of State suggested that these weapon systems
could be used for long-range biological or chemical attacks. President’s
Speech to the UN General Assembly (September 12, 2002) (U) In the
President’s address to the United Nations General Assembly, he stated
that "Iraq also possesses a force of Scud-type missiles with ranges
beyond the 150 kilometers permitted by the U.N. Work at testing and
production facilities shows that Iraq is building more long-range missiles
that it can [sic] inflict mass death throughout the region."l°7 This
statement included two separate assertions: that Iraq possessed missiles
with greater-than-permitted range, and that Iraq was building more
long-range missiles and increasing the size of its missile force. This
statement also implied that these missiles could be used to deliver
weapons of mass destruction, but this was not specifically stated.
(U)
Iraq’s ballistic missile force, as viewed by US intelligence analysts in
2002, can be broken into three fairly distinct categories: 1) older
Scud-type missiles with ranges of 625-900 km, remaining from its pre-Gulf
War missile force, 2) newer A1-Samoud and Ababil-100 missiles with
estimated ranges of 150-300 km, and 3) future mediurn-range missiles with
ranges of 750- 3000 km (which were assessed in 2002 to still be in the
development stage). The maximum range permitted by UN sanctions was 150
km.
(U) The CIA and DIA both assessed that Iraq was in the process of
deploying the A1-Samoud and Ababil-100 short-range missiles. Estimates of
these missiles’ range varied between 150 and 300 km.‘°8
(U) At this
time the intelligence community also assessed that Iraq possessed a small
number of pre-Gulf War Scud-variant short-range ballistic missiles.
Estimates varied as to the size of this force, but a May 2002 assessment
from State INR stated that "the highest estimates are on the order of
25-30 missiles."l°9 In March 2002 the DIA assessed that this force
"probably" included 107 White House Transcript, President 's
Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly, September l2, 2002. 108
CIA, Iraq: Al Samoud Program Advancing Toward Deployment, February 13,
2001; DIA, Proly’eration of Ballistic Missiles, January 9, 2002; DIA,
Iraq Missile Proly’eration Activity (TS-9l, 650-02) March l, 2002; CIA,
Expanding WMD Capabilities Pose Growing Threat, August l, 2002. 109 State/INR,
Iraq: WMD and Ballistic Missile Programs, May 8, 2002. _ 52
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